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ABSTRACT 
The Marine Corps has been very successful at meeting 
its yearly recruiting goal. However, the Marine Corps does 
struggle to recruit the correct number of applicants into 
each enlistment program. Enlistment bonuses are used to 
attract highly qualified applicants into critically short 
enlistment programs and the enlistment bonus budget has 
increased significantly in the past 3 years. The Marine 
Corps has the ability to determine what enlistment programs 
are considered “difficult to fill” and the capability to 
increase the number of allocations and the dollar amount of 
enlistment bonuses. However, the Marine Corps does not have 
the ability to determine the optimal dollar amount for an 
enlistment bonus. This research begins by analyzing methods 
used in previous studies to estimate the optimal enlistment 
incentive. The research found that choice-based surveys 
administered to recruits could be used to determine optimal 
enlistment incentives. Then the study analyzed eight years 
of recruiting data obtained from the Total Force Data 
Warehouse and the Marine Corps Recruiting Command. Results 
show that the enlistment bonus program (EBP) was unchanged 
for several years and other factors identified could be 
decreasing the effectiveness of the EBP. With the 
information provided by this thesis, the Marine Corps can 
increase the effectiveness of the EBP.         
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 This research analyzed the Marine Corps enlistment 
bonus program. The objective is to determine how the Marine 
Corps can optimally predict the amount to allocate for 
enlistment bonuses. The Marine Corps uses enlistment 
bonuses to attract highly qualified applicants into 
enlistment programs for critically short military 
occupational skills.1  
A. BACKGROUND 
Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA) is the largest 
department within Head Quarters Marine Corps (HQMC). “This 
organization “assists the Commandant by planning, 
directing, coordinating, and supervising both active and 
reserve forces.”2 M&RA in the Marine Corps could be compared 
to a human resource department within a major corporation. 
M&RA consists of seven branches as shown in the 
organizational structure in Figure 1. 
 Enlisted Manpower Plans section, in response to a 
significant increase in the enlistment bonus budget, 
requested that the Naval Postgraduate School analyze the 
Marine Corps enlistment bonus program to ensure that the 
section was maximizing the effectiveness of the program.  
 
                     
1 Marine Corps Order 1130.53P dated 11 June 2002. 
2 Manpower and Reserve Affairs website, 

























Figure 1.   Manpower & Reserve Affairs Task organization 
(Source: From HQMC, M&RA, MMOA, Road Show Brief, 2007) 
 
The Manpower Plans and Policy Division (MP) is one of 
the major branches within M&RA. The MP Division “is 
responsible for formulating Marine Corps force manpower and 
mobilization plans.”3 The MP Division is also responsible 
for “determining total manpower needs and preparing plans, 
policies, programs, and instructions on manpower matters to 
implement the Commandants policies and decisions.”4 Figure 2 
shows the organizational structure of the MP Division. 
                     
3 Manpower and Reserve Affairs website, 
https://www.manpower.usmc.mil, (Accessed on 1 January 2008).  
4Manpower and Reserve Affairs website, https://www.manpower.usmc.mil, 
(Accessed on 1 January 2008).   
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Figure 2.   MP Task Organization 
(Source: From HQMC, M&RA, MP Div Organization Chart Brief, 
2006) 
 
 Manpower Plans Programs and Budget Branch (MPP) 
resides in MP Division. MPP implements plans and policies 
that manage key areas such as end strength, promotions, 
accessions and retention. In FY 2007, the Marine Corps end 
strength was 184,000 and the MPP Branch is currently 
implementing plans and policies to reach the Commandant’s 
desired end strength of 202,000 by FY 2011. MPP is 
responsible for “assisting the Director of MP Division in 
implementing the Commandant’s policies and decisions by 
formulating manpower plans for both officer and the active 
duty enlisted force.”5 MPP Branch is broken down further 
                     
5 Manpower and Reserve Affairs website, 
https://www.manpower.usmc.mil, (Accessed on 1 January 2008).  
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into six sections as shown in Figure 2. One of the sections 
in MPP Branch is the Enlisted Plans Section (MPP-20).  
 MPP-20 is a key player in managing the enlisted force. 
MPP-20 is responsible for “assisting the director of MP 
Division in implementing the Commandant policies and 
decisions by formulating Manpower plans for the active duty 
enlisted force.”6 In FY 2007, enlisted end strength was 
166,783 active duty Marines but it will increase to more 
than 180,000 active duty Marines by FY 2011. MPP-20 
implements policies and plans to ensure the successful 
shaping of the enlisted force into the 233 primary Military 
Occupational Specialties (MOS). MPP-20 manages the career 
force and first-term inventory by implementing plans and 
policies that control retention, promotion and accessions 
for each MOS. Retention and promotion are critical aspects 
in managing the enlisted force, but this research will 
focus on using monetary incentives to assist managing 
accessions. 
 Each year MPP-20 determines the number of applicants 
the Marine Corps needs to recruit into each MOS. After MPP-
20’s recommendation is approved, the accession mission is 
assigned to the Marine Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC). In 
addition, MPP-20 evaluates the Marine Corps’ monetary 
incentives and recommends changes to assist MCRC in meeting 
its recruiting goal. The Marine Corps has three types of 
monetary incentive programs: the college fund, enlistment 
bonuses, and shipping bonuses, as shown in Table 1. 
 
 
                     
6 Manpower and Reserve Affairs website, 
https://www.manpower.usmc.mil, (Accessed on 1 January 2008). 
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Table 1.   Marine Corps Monetary Incentive Programs 
Current Monetary Incentive Programs 
Program Term (years) Monetary Value
Enlistment Bonus Program 
(Specific job Skill) 
2-6 $3,000-$15,000
Marine Corps College Fund 
(Any job skill) 
4-6 $50,000+ 
Shipping Bonus           
(Any job skill) 
4-6 $5,000 
(Source: HQMC, M&RA, Enlisted Plans Section) 
  
The Marine Corps has been very successful at meeting 
its yearly recruiting goal. However, Marine Corps 
Recruiting data has not been available since the inception 
of the All-Volunteer Force. An official at MCRC stated that 
the Marine Corps has met its recruiting goal every year for 
the past ten years.7 Meeting the recruiting goal means that 
if MCRC was tasked to recruit 32,000 applicants in FY 2005, 
then MCRC recruited a total of 32,000 or more applicants.     
B. PROBLEM 
 The nature of the problem lies in recruiting the 
correct number of applicants into each enlistment program 
and shipping the applicants to recruit training at a 
specified time. In FY 2002, MCRC made its annual recruiting 
goal, but the Marine Corps was short, for example, 321 
applicants designated to the transportation program and 527 
applicants designated to the supply and accounting program.8 
MCRC does recruit some recruits with “open contracts” who 
can be assigned to critically short MOSs, but recruits with 
                     
7 Phone Interview with Mike Styka, MCRC Deputy Head Enlisted 
Recruiting, 29 November 2007. 
8 MCRC end of the year recruiting report.  
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open contracts often fall short of being fully qualified 
and may not meet the shipping time-line to be assigned to a 
critically short enlistment program. Failing to recruit the 
correct number of applicants into each MOS makes it 
difficult to ensure the successful shaping of the enlisted 
force to meet MOS requirements of fleet units. Even though 
MPP-20 determines the requirement for each MOS, certain 
MOSs are critically short due to their high prerequisites 
or perceived undesirability. In order to entice high-
quality applicants to select critically short enlistment 
programs, the Marine Corps provides enlistment bonuses. 
 MPP-20 has the ability to determine what enlistment 
programs are considered “difficult to fill.” The enlistment 
bonus budget has increased significantly over the last 3 
years as shown in Table 2. MPP-20 has the capability to 
increase the number of allocations and the dollar amount of 
enlistment bonuses. 
 
Table 2.   Marine Corps FY 2006-2008 EBP Budget 




a Initial budget was 10.6, increased to 47 in January 2007.
(Source: HQMC, M&RA, Enlisted Plans Section) 
 
However, MPP-20 does not have the ability to determine the 
optimal dollar amount for an enlistment bonus. What bonus 
incentive will level the playing field between a popular 
enlistment program and an unpopular one? In order for the 
Marine Corps to maximize the effectiveness of enlistment 
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programs, it needs a means to predict which monetary 
incentives will be the most effective. In addition, 
enlistment bonuses require applicants to meet minimum 
requirements that may be higher than the minimum 
requirements for the enlistment program.  As a result 
applicants who are qualified for a hard-to-fill enlistment 
program, but not qualified for an enlistment bonus, have no 
incentive to select a hard-to-fill enlistment program. As 
the Marine Corps increases end strength, a key factor in 
successfully shaping the enlisted force will be recruiting 
the optimal mix of applicants into the 233 MOSs. 
C. PURPOSE 
 The purpose of this research is to provide MPP-20 
alternatives for increasing the effectiveness of the 
enlistment bonus program. This research identifies and 
recommends tools that can be used to determine the optimal 
incentive amount for enlistment bonuses. Additionally, this 
research identifies factors that are significant to the 
Marine Corps ability to man hard-to-fill enlistment 
programs. The results are relevant to MPP-20 and can assist 
them in effectively allocating monetary incentives to 
attract high quality applicants into critical enlistment 
programs. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
How can MPP-20 effectively predict the optimal dollar 
amount for enlistment bonuses? 
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2. Secondary Research Questions 
a.  What factors could be decreasing the 
effectiveness of the enlistment bonus program? 
b.  Can the Marine Corps Total Force Data Warehouse 
be used to effectively predict the incentives for 
enlistment bonuses? 
c.  Do minimum AFQT requirements for enlistment 
bonus programs decrease the effectiveness of the program? 
 E. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
The scope includes: (1) a review of the Marine Corps 
enlistment bonus program order; (2) an in-depth review of 
the literature on prior enlistment programs assigned an 
enlistment bonus; and (3) an evaluation of the Marine Corps 
Recruiting data contained within the Total Force Data 
Warehouse (TFDW). The thesis concludes with recommendations 
for incorporating alternatives to assist MPP-20 in 
effectively allocating enlistment incentives to attract 
high quality applicants into critical enlistment programs. 
The methodology for this research is qualitative. The 
research also utilizes recruiting data from the TFDW and 
from MCRC. The data in the research focuses on the active 
duty enlisted applicants that have shipped to recruit 
training over the past eight years. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
 This research is organized into five separate 
chapters. Chapter I gives an introduction and background on 
the research issue. Chapter II provides information on the 
enlistment bonus programs used in the past and the 
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enlistment bonus programs currently being used. Chapter III 
reviews prior studies on enlistment bonus programs. Chapter 
IV describes the data and variables used in study. Chapter 
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II. MARINE CORPS ENLISTMENT BONUS PROGRAM 
 The United States Marine Corps enlistment bonus 
program (EBP) has two primary objectives: 
 1. Attract highly qualified applicants to select 
designated enlistment programs;9 and 
 2. Encourage applicants to ship to recruit training 
during certain times of the year.   
The EBP serves as a vital tool in shaping the 
structure of the enlisted force. The theory is that 
offering a monetary incentive is the most cost-effective 
means to fill enlistment programs that otherwise would not 
be filled.  While generating new enlistments is not an 
objective of the EBP, previous studies have shown that the 
EBP has been responsible for generating new enlistments. 
(Palomba, 1983) 
A. ORDERS AND INSTRUCTIONS GOVERNING THE ENLISTMENT BONUS 
PROGRAM 
 Enlistment bonuses are governed by section 309(a) of 
title 37 United States Code, Department of Defense (DOD) 
Directive 1304.21, and Marine Corps Order 1130.53P. 
According to DoD Directive 1304.21, the Secretary of the 
Military Department establishes the standards for awarding 
an enlistment bonus and the value of enlistment bonuses, 
but enlistment bonuses may not exceed the maximum amount 
prescribed in section 309(a) of Title 37.10 “The intent of 
                     
9  Highly qualified applicants are generally considered to be high 
school graduates that score a 50 or higher on the Armed forces 
Qualification test.  
10 DoD Dir 1304.21 
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enlistment bonuses is to influence personnel inventories in 
specific situations in which less costly methods have 
proven inadequate or impractical.”11  
 In accordance with MCO 1130.53P, “The EBP provides 
monetary enlistment incentives to attract highly qualified 
applicants into designated programs containing critically 
short MOSs, to fill those technical fields with high 
prerequisites, and to entice applicants to ship to recruit 
training during certain times of the year.”12 The award 
levels of enlistment bonuses and programs eligible for a 
bonus are determined by MPP-20 and published via MARADMIN 
message before the beginning of each fiscal year. Within 
the EBP, there are two categories of bonuses: a bonus tied 
to an enlistment program and a bonus tied to shipping to 
recruit training during certain times of the year.
 Enlistment programs apply to several different MOSs. 
Applicants who enlist in the Marine Corps are not 
guaranteed a specific MOS. They are guaranteed an 
enlistment program and the Marine Corps will assign the 
applicant one of the MOSs within the enlistment program. 
The number and type of enlistments programs has varied over 
time, but currently the Marine Corps has approximately 35 
different enlistment programs. The Marine Corps’ 233 
enlisted MOSs are divided up amongst the 35 different 
enlistment programs. For example if an applicant enlists in 
the Electronics Maintenance program, he or she would be 
assigned one of the 13 different MOSs as shown in Figure 3. 
 
                     
11 DoD Dir 1304.21  
12 MCO 1130.53P dated 11 Jun 2002 
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Figure 3.   Electronics Maintenance Enlistment Program 
(Source: MCO 1130.53P dated 11 June 2002) 
 
Just because an enlistment program has a bonus does 
not mean that every applicant who enlists into that program 
will receive the bonus. For example, in FY 2000 the Marine 
Corps had a requirement of 965 applicants for the 
electronics maintenance program, but there were only 431 
bonuses allocated for the program. Fifty-five percent of 
the applicants who enlisted in the electronics maintenance 
program did not receive a bonus.  
 Unlike the Army, which pays enlistment bonuses in 
anniversary payments over the term of the enlistment, 
enlistment bonuses in the Marine Corps are paid in one lump 
sum. MCO 1130.53P states that “in order to receive the 
bonus, the applicant must complete all required training 
and be qualified in an MOS within the specified EBP.”13 All 
                     
13 MCO 1130.53P dated 11 Jun 2002 
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Marines who receive an enlistment bonus that is tied to an 
MOS are required to serve in billets requiring their 
primary MOS.  Additionally, the Marine must maintain the 
MOS throughout his or her entire term of enlistment. A 
Marine who fails to complete the full term of enlistment is 
required to repay a pro rata share of the enlistment 
bonus.14  
 Applicants must meet certain eligibility requirements 
to qualify for an enlistment bonus program. The eligibility 
requirements tend to remain constant, but there have been 
changes over time. An overview of the eligibility 
requirements for the EBP is shown in Table 3. Applicants 
that enlist in EBP are required to fill out a Statement of 
Understanding (SOU). The SOU serves as a contract between 
the applicant and the United States Marine Corps. The SOU 
lays out in detail the eligibility requirements for the 
program, the value of the bonus, the term of enlistment, 
the MOSs within that EBP, and the reasons for 











                     
14 MCO 1130.53P dated 11 Jun 2002 
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Table 3.   Marine Corps EBP eligibility requirements 
 
1. Non-prior service applicant or a prior service applicant 
who has not previously received an enlistment bonus. 
2. Reservists not on active duty who enlist in the active 
component must not have been previously awarded an 
enlistment bonus or reenlistment bonus, or currently be 
entitled to a reenlistment bonus. 
3. Tier 1 high school graduate. 
4. Meet minimum AFQT score, required line scores, and all 
other prerequisites of the program. 
5. No drug/moral waiver above recruiting station level.  
(Source: From MCO 1130.53P dated 11 June 2002) 
  
Applicants who enlist for an EBP can become disqualified 
for the EBP while in the delayed entry program or during 
their enlistment. An overview of the circumstances that 
would lead to disqualification is shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4.   Circumstances for disqualification from EBP 
 
1. Using drugs while in the delayed entry program. 
2. Failure to complete a required course of training and 
maintain the designated MOS throughout the term of 
enlistment. 
3. Inability to obtain a required security clearance. 
4. Disciplinary action (including NJP). 
5. Not divulging required information regarding education or 
other qualifications for the program. 
6. Entry-level separation. 
7. Failure to complete term of enlistment. 
8. Failure to receive an honorable discharge. 
9. Failure to reveal previous bonus received. 
(Source: From MCO 1130.53P dated 11 June 2002) 
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B. INCORPORATION OF THE ENLISTMENT BONUS PROGRAM 
The Marine Corps EBP program has been around for many 
years, but until recently only a fraction of the enlistment 
programs qualified for a bonus. This research found that 
historical information on the EBP is limited, so it is 
difficult to determine the exact date that the Marine Corps 
incorporated the EBP. It could be stated that the first 
Marine Corps enlistment bonus was offered in 1775, when 
Captain Robert Mullen offered a recruit a free tankard of 
ale for enlisting in the Marine Corps.15 For the purposes of 
this study it will be determined that the Marine Corps 
incorporated the EBP around 1972. In June 1972, the Marine 
Corps began offering a $1,500 combat arms enlistment bonus 
(CB) (Palomba, 1983). The CB program was used to fill MOSs 
within the infantry, artillery, and tank communities. The 
monetary incentive of the CB program was increased to 
$2,500 in FY 1974. In addition, the Marine Corps 
incorporated a $2,500 technical bonus (TB) program in FY 
1975 that was reduced to $1,500 in FY 1976. The monetary 









                     
15 Captain Robert Mullen was the first Marine Corps Recruiter 
(Source: www.recruitknowledge.com/pages/history/mch1.htm).  
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Table 5.   Monetary value of TB and CB programs 
Dollar Amount for Bonus Payments
Fiscal Year TB CB 
1973 - $1,500 
1974 - $2,500 
1975 $2,500 $2,500 
1976 $1,500 $2,500 
1977 $1,500 $2,500 
1978 $1,500 $2,500 
1979 $1,500 $2,500 
1980 $1,500 $2,500 
1981 $3,000 $2,500 
(Source: (Palomba, 1983), Table 2) 
 
The number of bonus allocations was small, so only a 
fraction of qualified recruits received an enlistment bonus 
(Palomba, 1983) as shown in Table 6. The recruiting goal 
for FY 1978 through FY 1981 was not available, but the 
Marine Corps annual recruiting goal for the past ten years 
has been around 30,000 recruits. If the recruiting goal in 
the late 70’s and early 80’s was similar, around 11 percent 
of the recruits would have received an enlistment bonus.  
 
Table 6.   Bonus attainment/allocation by year 
TB Program CB Program 
Year Attainment Allocation % Attainment Allocation % 
1978 1,000 1,000 100.0 2,340 2,340 100.0 
1979 1,101 1,089 101.1 2,357 2,341 100.6 
1980 1,125 1,298 86.6 2,339 2,342 99.8 
1981 1,151 1,320 87.2 2,690 2,690 100.0 
(Source: (Palomba, 1983), Table 3) 
 
As with the current EBP, recruits had to meet minimal 
eligibility requirements to qualify for the programs. The 
TB program required recruits to be high school graduates, 
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U.S. Citizens, and to meet prescribed score requirements on 
the ASVAB. A recruit enlisting in the CB program had to be 
male, have a high school diploma or GED, and to meet 
prescribed score requirements on the ASVAB. The eligibility 
requirements for the CB and TB programs are shown in Table 
7. 
 
Table 7.   Eligibility Requirements for the CB and TB 
Test score requirements for the enlistment bonus program 
ASVAB   TB CB 
AFQT 50 31 
GT 110 90 (95 for GED) 
EL 120 - 
(Source: From (Palomba, 1983), Table 1) 
 
A key difference in the eligibility requirements of 
the CB program and future EBPs is the minimum AFQT score of 
31 and the fact that recruits with GED’s qualified for an 
enlistment bonus. Sometime after FY 1981, all applicants 
were required to have a minimum AFQT of 50 and be a high 
school graduate to qualify for an enlistment bonus. As will 
be shown later, the minimum AFTQT requirement changed again 
in FY 2006. This study was only able to find information on 
the CB and TB programs up to FY 1981. After FY 1981, there 
is limited information on the EBP until the mid 1990’s.  
There was a period where the Marine Corps EBP budget 
was almost nonexistent. The EBP budget in FY 1994 was only 
750 thousand dollars. The Marine Corps had allotted more 
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money for the EBP program in 1978.16 After FY 1994, the EBP 
budget increased each year until it reached more than 6 
million dollars in FY 2000. The EBP budget for FY 1978 
through FY 1981 and FY 1994 through FY 2005 are shown in 
Table 8. 
 
Table 8.   EBP budget (FY78-FY81 & FY94-FY05) 
(Source: HQMC, M&RA, Enlisted Plans Section) 
 
 In FY 1999 the EBP offered two types of shipping 
bonuses: a 2,000 dollar bonus for shipping in the months of 
June through November and a 3,000 dollar bonus for shipping 
in the months of December through May. The intent was that 
recruiters typically had more difficulty finding applicants 
to ship to recruit training between December and May, so a 
                     
16 The actual budgets for the EBP in the late 1970’s were not 
available, so this study multiplied the bonus amounts by the number of 
allocations to determine the EBP budgets in the late 1970’s. The EBP 
budgets in the late 1970’s were more than 6 million dollars.  
Budget for Enlisted Bonus Program 
Fiscal Year Budget (millions) Fiscal Year Budget (millions) 
FY78  7.350a FY98  2.75 
FY79  7.486a FY99  5.204 
FY80  7.80a FY00  6.729 
FY81 10.685a FY01  6.655 
FY94   .750 FY02  6.995 
FY95  1.355 FY03  8.49 
FY96  3.12 FY04  9.416 
FY97  3.615 FY05  5.802 
a: The actual budget for the EBP was not available, so the bonus amount
was multiplied by the number of allocations to determine the EBP 
budget. 
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higher shipping bonus was offered in those months. In 
addition there were five enlistment programs that qualified 
for a bonus in FY 1999: the Aircrew Enlistment program, 
Electronics Maintenance program, Aviation Operations 
program, Fire Direction & Control Specialist program, and 
the Cryptologic Linguist program. In FY 2000 the Aircrew 
Enlistment program was dropped and the Public Affairs 
program and the Aviation Electronics Technician program 
were added to the EBP. The Marine Corps EBP program 
remained virtually unchanged for several years, as shown in 
Tables 9 and 10. The only change was the number of bonuses 
allocated each year. According to an official at MCRC, the 
Marine Corps was consistently meeting its recruiting goal 
and the EBP had a limited budget, so manpower officials 
chose not to make any changes to EBP. 
Table 9.   FY 2005 Enlistment Programs with Bonuses 
(Source: MCRC, End of FY recruiting report) 
Allocations per fiscal year Bonus 
Program 
Dollar 
Value Term FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05
Electronic 
Maintenance 5,000 5 
b 431 500 529 578 412 644
Aviation 
Operations 4,000 5 
b 85 120 118 124 108 134
Public 
Affairs 4,000 4 _ 15 15 12 35 18 31
Fire Dir & 
Ctrl Spec 6,000 4 
b 187 210 196 178 143 192
Crypto 
Linguist 4,000 5 
b 24 50 50 109 71 106
Aviation 
Elect Tech 3,000 5 _ 539 650 594 490 475 543




c 2 _ _ _ _ _ _ 240 
a Length of term not available. 
b Bonus offered, but number of allocation not available. 
c Applicants selected one of the following four incentives: $5,000 bonus 
or $10,000 student loan repayment or 12 month education allowance or 36 
month education allowance at ½ monthly rate. 
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Table 10.   FY 1999 – FY 2005 EBP (Shipping Bonus) 
(Source: MCRC, End of FY recruiting report) 
 
Major revisions were made in the EBP in FY 2006 
through FY 2008. There are several reasons that led to 
revising the EBP, but the main contributor was the increase 
in recruiting goals to meet the Marine Corps’ new end 
strength. In 2006 plans were made to increase the Marine 
Corps end strength from approximately 181,000 in FY 2006 to 
202,000 in FY 2011. Increasing end strength required 
increasing the annual recruiting goals, as shown in Table 
11. 
 
Table 11.   Marine Corps end strength and accession 
missions.  
Marine Corps Active 
Duty Force 
FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 
End Strength Goal 184,000 189,000 194,000 199,000 202,000
Enlisted Strength 166,783 172,489 178,663 181,180 180,865
Enlisted Accession 
Mission 
35,576 37,967 39,800 40,400 41,400
Officer Accession 
Mission 
1,975 2,220 2,370 2,428 2,277
Reenlistment 
Mission 
16,098 17,631 18,100 18,400 18,700
(Source: HQMC, M&RA, Enlisted Plans Section) 
 
Shipping Bonus 
Allocations per fiscal year 
Time Period Dollar Amount FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05
Dec-May $3,000 a 1327 a 1154 1248 1480 456 
Jun–Nov $2,000 a 555 a 956 161 56 35 
a Shipping bonus offered, but number of allocations not available.   
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Increasing the recruiting goals encouraged officials 
at MPP-20 and MCRC to take a hard look at the current 
incentive programs, which led to increases in the EBP 
budget. At the end of FY 2006, MPP-20 and MCRC determined 
that changes needed to be made in the EBP to increase its 
effectiveness. One requirement was that MPP-20 and MCRC 
conduct an annual review of the EBP. This ensured that MPP-
20 received adequate feedback from the recruiters. In 
addition, recruiters were given the opportunity to 
recommend incentives they thought would be most beneficial 
in meeting recruiting goals. Furthermore, increasing the 
EBP budget gave MPP-20 the flexibility to develop a more 
versatile program. The FY 2007 EBP budget increased from 
10.6 million dollars to 47 million dollars in January 2007, 
as shown in Table 12. 
 
Table 12.   FY 2005 through FY 2008 EBP budget 
Marine Corps EBP Budget 





a Initial budget was 10.6, increased to 47 in January 2007. 
(Source: HQMC, M&RA, Enlisted Plans Section) 
 
The end of FY 2005 marked the beginning of the major 
revisions in the Marine Corps’ EBP. The EBP went from seven 
enlistment programs in FY 2005 to fourteen enlistment 
programs eligible for a bonus in FY 2007. The maximum value 
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of enlistment bonuses more than doubled, and eligibility 
requirements were modified for specific enlistment 
programs. The enlistment programs in the EBP for FY 2005 
through FY 2008 are shown in Table 13. 
 
Table 13.   FY05-FY08 Enlistment Programs with Bonus 
Allocations per fiscal year Bonus 
Program 
Dollar 
Value Term FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 
5,000 644 533 350 - Electronic 
Maintenance 15,000 
5 
- - - 500 
Public 
Affairs 4,000 4 31 36 - - 
Aviation 
Operations 4,000 5 134 155 109 - 
Fire Dir & Ctrl 
Specialist 6,000 4 192 201 201 203 
4,000 106 104 125 - Cryptologic 
Linguist 15,000 
5 
- - - 281 
Aviation 
Electronic Tech 3,000 5 543 554 204 - 
National Call 
to Service a 2 240 308 338 - 
Reconnaissance 10,000 4 - 402 416 399 
4,000 - c c - Arabic 
Interpreter  12,000 
4-6b 
- c c - 
5,000 - - 216 - Transportation 
10,000 
4 
- - - 501 
5,000 - - 197 - Supply & 
Accounting 10,000 
4 
- - - 603 
Logistics 5,000 4 - - 260 - 
Intel/ Grd 
Elect Warfare 6,000 5 - - 165 102 
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Allocations per fiscal year Bonus 
Program 
Dollar 
Value Term FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 
Command & Ctrl 
Electrician 10,000 4 - - - 625 
7,500 5 - - - 900 Infantry 
15,000 6 - - - 300 
Marine Corps 
Music 10,000 4 - - c 36 
X1d 10,000  - - 1028 - 
a Four incentives to choose from: $5,000 bonus or $10,000 student ln 
repayment or 12 month education allowance or 36 month education 
allowance (½ monthly rate). 
b Term of enlistment depended on enlistment program selected. 
c Bonus offered, but number of allocations not available.  
d Targeted bonus to entice applicants to enlist in critically low
programs (Supply/Acct, Transportation, Communications, Electronic/Data 
program) and ship to recruit training in Aug-Sep 2007.  
(Source: MCRC, End of FY recruiting report)  
 
 In FY 2006 only three additional enlistment programs 
were incorporated into the EBP, but changes in the 
eligibility requirements opened the doors for future 
enlistment programs. For several years applicants were 
required to have a minimum AFQT of 50 to receive any type 
of enlistment bonus. In FY 2006 an applicant enlisting into 
the Arabic interpreter program could receive a 4,000 dollar 
bonus with a minimum AFQT of 21 and a 12,000 bonus with a 
minimum AFQT of 31. 
 Revising eligibility requirements continued into FY 
2007 when the minimum AFQT requirement for shipping bonuses 
and the X1 enlistment program was reduced to 31. In 
addition to reducing the AFQT requirement for shipping 
bonuses, there was only one monetary value offered in FY 
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2007.17 It was a 3,000 dollar shipping bonus that could be 
offered for any month in FY 2007. Furthermore, the number 
of shipping bonuses allocated in FY 2007 was significantly 
higher than in previous years. Table 14 provides the 
shipping bonuses for FY 2005 through FY 2008. 
Table 14.   FY05-FY08 Shipping Bonuses 
Allocations per fiscal year Time 
Period 
Dollar 
Amount FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 
Dec-May $3,000 456 562 - - 
Jun–Nov $2,000 35 323 - - 
$3,000 - - 10945 - All Year 
$5,000 - - - 7300 
(Source: MCRC, End of FY recruiting report) 
 
 The X1 program in FY 2007 was unique. It was a 10,000 
dollar targeted enlistment bonus incorporated mid-year to 
entice applicants to enlist into critically low enlistment 
programs and ship to recruit training in August through 
September 2007. The programs offering the bonus were Supply 
and Accounting, Transportation, Communications, and 
Electronic Data. The Supply and Accounting program and 
Transportation program already offered a 5,000 dollar bonus 
in FY 2007, but the programs required a minimum AFQT of 50. 
The X1 program aided in enlisting 935 applicants into four 
critically short enlistment programs. In addition to the X1 
program, three more enlistment programs were incorporated 
into the EBP in FY 2007, as shown in Table 13.  
                     
17 In previous years there was a 3,000 dollar shipping bonus for 
shipping to recruit training in December through May and a 2,000 dollar 
shipping bonus for shipping to recruit training in June through 
November (MCRC, End of year reports). 
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 In FY 2008, MPP-20 and MCRC continued to revise the 
EBP. Enlistment programs that they determined did not 
require an enlistment bonus for FY 2008 was removed from 
the EBP and that money was diverted to other enlistment 
programs, as shown in Table 12. MPP-20 and MCRC also 
reviewed the requirements for all enlistment programs in 
the EBP and decided to revise the enlistment bonus 
requirements for three enlistment programs. The minimum 
AFQT requirement was reduced for the Transportation, Supply 
and Accounting and the Command and Control/Electrician 
programs. The intent behind the revision is to give 
applicants who are qualified for a critically low 
enlistment program, but not qualified for an enlistment 
bonus, an incentive to select critically low enlistment 
programs.18 Revising the minimum AFQT requirement for 
certain enlistment programs is also intended to increase 
enlistments in critically low enlistment programs.19 The 
minimum AFQT and line score requirements for the FY 2008 
EBP are shown in Table 15. 
 
Table 15.   FY 2008 EBP minimum AFQT/line score 
(individual components of the AFQT) requirements.  
Programa AFQT GT MM CL EL 
Electronics Maintenance 50 - - - 110 
Fire Dir & Ctrl Specialist 50 105 - - - 
Cryptologic Linguist 50 105 - - - 
Reconnaissance 50 105 - - - 
Transportation 40 - 85 - - 
                     
18 Phone interview with official within MPP-20. 
19 Phone interview with official within MPP-20. 
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Supply/Acct. 40 - - 105 - 
Intel/ Grd Elect Warfare 50 100 - - - 
Command & Ctrl Electrician 40 - - - 95 
Infantry ($15,000) 50 100 - - - 
Infantry ($7,500) 50 90 - - - 
Music 50 - - - - 
Shipping Bonus 31 - - - - 
a This table only provides the ASVAB requirements. There are additional requirements 
specific to each enlistment program an applicant must meet to be eligible for the EBP.   
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Since the inception of the all-volunteer force in 
1973, the United States Armed Forces has been offering 
competitive compensation packages in order to recruit 
enough volunteers (Warner & Asch, 2001). Aside from 
increasing military basic pay, the services increased the 
use of monetary incentives to attract recruit-age youths.20 
There have been numerous studies on military enlistment 
bonuses, but this study found only one study on Marine 
Corps enlistment bonuses. The lack of Marine Corps studies 
could be due to the fact that the incentive programs in the 
Marine Corps have been relatively small, making it 
difficult to estimate bonus effects.  
A. METHODOLOGIES OF PREVIOUS STUDIES 
The methodologies of previous studies have varied, but 
generally they used regression analysis on historical data 
or analysis of survey responses. The advantage of 
historical data is that it tends to be readily available 
and it captures real choices with binding decisions. In 
addition, researchers can infer which of the available 
incentives is the most popular by analyzing the choices of 
enlistees (Kraus, Griffis, & Golfin, 2000). One drawback is 
that historical data provides information only on people 
who joined the military and cannot be used to evaluate the 
effectiveness of incentives never accepted. The drawback to 
surveys is that applicable surveys are not always 
available; and developing surveys and collecting the data 
                     
20 Recruit age youths are normally categorized as 17-21.   
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can be time-intensive and costly. The benefit of surveys is 
that researchers can learn which incentives are preferred 
by recruit-age youths. Because only opinions rather than 
actions are involved, surveys can include incentives not 
offered as well as those already in use (Palomba, 1983). 
The remainder of this chapter will provide summaries of the 
results of previous studies on enlistment bonuses. 
B. SURVEYS 
 Surveys used to analyze monetary incentives vary in 
complexity, but they typically gather data from either the 
civilian youth population or military recruits. An 
advantage to collecting information from military recruits 
or enlistees is that they are more accessible and they are 
familiar with military programs. Recruits and enlistees can 
also provide insight into why they chose to enlist, what 
they would have done in the absence of an incentive, and 
what decisions they would have made if other incentives had 
been offered. Information from military recruits is 
beneficial when trying to determine how to channel 
applicants into critically short enlistment programs 
(Kraus, Griffis, & Golfin, 2000). However, since military 
recruits chose to enlist they can not provide information 
as to why others chose not to enlist. The advantage to 
collecting information from the civilian youth population 
is that they can provide insight into why people choose not 
to enlist and what incentives would encourage them to 
consider enlisting in the military. Collecting information 
from the civilian youth population is very useful when 
military services are trying to expand their recruiting 
market (Kraus, Griffis, & Golfin, 2000). 
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1. Survey Data from Marine Corps Enlistees 
Catherine A. Palomba conducted a study on the Marine 
Corps enlistment bonus program in 1983. By analyzing survey 
data the author was able to determine the effect of the EBP 
on enlistment supply. The survey was conducted by the Rand 
Corporation in 1979 and administered to Marine Corps 
enlistees at the military entrance processing station 
(Palomba, 1983). The survey consisted of four different 
forms with three to four questions on each form. The author 
chose to use form-1 and form-3 because they were deemed 
most relevant to the study (Palomba, 1983). The questions 
on form-1 and form-3 were identical except form-1 had one 
additional question. Approximately 937 enlistees completed 
form-1 and 898 enlistees completed form-3 (Palomba, 1983). 
The survey questions used in the study are provided in 
Table 16 and the responses to the first question are 
provided in Table 17. 
 
Table 16.   Survey Questions 
1. Did you sign up for a job which pays a cash enlistment bonus 
when you complete your job training? 
(Yes, No, I don’t know) 
 
2. How much is your bonus? 
(500, 1000, 1500, 2000, 2500, 3000)  
 
3. Suppose the job you signed up for did not pay a cash bonus. 
What would you have done? 
(Same service/same job, Same service/different job, Different 
service, Not enlisted)  
 
4. If you could choose the length of your first enlistment how 
many years of active duty would you sign up for?a 
(Less than 4 years, 4 years or more)   
a Question 4 was only on form-1. 
  (Source: Palomba, 1983)  
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Table 17.   Responses to Question 1. 
 
BONUS QUESTION 
Form 1 Form 3 
RESPONSE Number Percent Number Percent 
Yes 133 14.2 107 11.9 
No 369 39.4 383 42.6 
I don’t know 401 42.8 350 39.0 
No Answer 34 3.6 58 6.5 
Total 937 100.0 898 100.0 
    (Source: Palomba, 1983, Table 7)   
 
 Palomba reported that “of the 937 Marine Corps 
enlistees who completed form-1, 133 answered yes to the 
bonus question” (Palomba, 1983). There were 369 “No” 
responses and 401 “I don’t know responses”. The author 
stated that the large number of “I don’t know” responses 
was probably due to the wording of the question. The survey 
asks the enlistee if they signed up for a job that pays a 
cash bonus. Enlistees would have known if they had received 
a cash bonus, but they may not have known if the job they 
enlisted for was eligible for a bonus. The results on form-
1 and form-3 were similar as shown in Table 17. The next 
step taken by the author was to review the responses to 
questions 2 and 3. Questions 2 and 3 only applied to the 
enlistees who stated they received a cash bonus. The 






Table 18.   Responses to Question 2 
BONUS AMOUNT
Form 1 Form 3Response Number Percent Number Percent 
500 12 9.0 10 9.3 
1000 4 3.0 3 2.8 
1500 38 28.6 23 21.6 
2000 9 6.8 3 2.8 
2500 59 44.3 62 57.9 
3000 3 2.3 0 0 
No answer 8 6.0 6 5.6 
(Source: Palomba, 1983, Table 8) 
  
During the time period this survey was given the 
Marine Corps offered only a $1,500 and a $2,500 bonus. 
Several of the enlistees stated they received a different 
amount as shown in Table 18. The author does not provide 
the details as to why the survey provided options that were 
not offered. Providing different options may have been used 
to determine how much or how little the enlistees knew 
about enlistment bonuses. Since the survey does not ask the 
enlistees which enlistment program they signed up for, the 
author tries to determine what program the enlistees signed 
up for by comparing the bonus amount selected and the 
amount offered by the Marine Corps during that time period.        
 
Table 19.   Responses to Question 3 (Alternatives to 
Bonus Enlistment) 
Form 1 Form 3 
Alternatives Number Percent Number Percent
Same service, same job 87 65.4 77 72.0 
Same service, different job 28 21.1 22 20.6 
Different service 5 3.7 4 3.7 
Not enlisted 9 6.8 3 2.8 
No answer 4 3.0 1 .9 
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Form 1 Form 3 
Alternatives Number Percent Number Percent
Total 133 100.0 107 100.0 
(Source: Palomba, 1983, Table 8) 
 
 One of Palomba’s objectives was to determine how many 
enlistments among the bonus recruits were gained due to the 
enlistment bonus. The study used the responses to question 
3 to estimate the enlistments gains. The responses to the 
alternatives offered in lieu of an enlistment bonus are 
provided in Table 19. “Averaging the results for those 
answering the ALTERNATIVES question on either form 1 or 
form 3, 70 percent of the respondents would have chosen the 
same service and the same job while an additional 21 
percent would have chosen the same service but a different 
job” (Palomba, 1983). “The residual, 9 percent, is the gain 
in manpower to the Marine Corps among bonus recruits” 
(Palomba, 1983). The author does not determine the actual 
gain to all Marine Corps accessions, but it would be 
significantly smaller. One way to get an idea of the gain 
to the Marine Corps is to consider the total number of 
enlistees in the survey. The survey consisted of 
approximate1y 1835 enlistees and 21 of those enlistees 
would not have joined the Marine Corps in the absence of an 
enlistment bonus. That works out to be a 1.14 percent gain 
in manpower among the enlistees in the survey. The author 
also wanted to determine the effectiveness of the 
enlistment bonus in channeling enlistees into critical 
programs. Palomba stated that the enlistment bonus resulted 
in 30 percent more enlistees selecting a critical skill.  
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 Form-1 had a fourth question that applied to enlistees 
who stated they would have enlisted without an enlistment 
bonus. The question asked the enlistees about their desired 
length of service. Fifty-five percent of the enlistees who 
said they would have enlisted in the same job stated that 
they would prefer a term less than four years, as shown in 
Table 20. 
 
Table 20.   Responses to question 4 
Enlistees who would have joined the Marine Corps without a bonus 
Choice of term Same Job Different Job 
Less than 4 years 46 (55%) 15 (58%) 
4 or more years 37 11 
Total 83 26 
(Source: Palomba, 1983, Table 9) 
 
The author states that the results suggest that an 
enlistment bonus could lengthen the term of service for 55 
percent of the enlistees who would have enlisted anyway. Of 
course, the enlistee would prefer a four-year term. What 
incentive would encourage the choice of a longer term?  
 The study does not provide enough information about 
the survey to determine if the survey respondents are a 
good representation of all Marine Corps enlistees. The 
sample size was adequate, but there could have been some 
selection bias. Some things to consider are the geographic 
area the survey was taken from, whether the survey was 
voluntary, as well as that all of the respondents had chose 
to join the Marine Corps. The survey would have been more 
informative if it had incorporated some questions that 
offered different enlistment options in order to infer  
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enlistee preferences. In all, the study did show that a 
simple survey given to Marine Corps enlistees could provide 
some useful feedback. 
 The nine percent gain to manpower among bonus 
enlistees may show that enlistment bonuses are not a key 
deciding factor to people joining the Marine Corps. This 
supports the results of other studies. For example, a RAND 
study conducted in 2000 looked at the effects of military 
pay on high quality contracts. The RAND study determined 
that the Marine Corps pay elasticity in relation to 
accessions was significantly lower than that of the other 
services (Asch, Hosek, Arkes, Fair, Sharp, and Totten, 
2002)21. The authors’ results of a 30 percent gain in 
critical enlistment programs shows that enlistment bonuses 
can be a effective tool in channeling enlistees into 
critically short enlistment programs. The study conducted 
by Palomba also used pay elasticity to analyze Marine Corps 
enlistment bonuses. That method will be discussed later in 
the chapter. 
2. Surveys from the Civilian Youth Population 
 CNA conducted a choice-based conjoint study of 
recruitment incentives for the Navy Recruiting Command 
(NRC) in 2000. The purpose of the study was to find new and 
innovative incentive packages to attract a greater number 
of high-quality applicants (Kraus, Griffis, & Golfin, 
2000). CNA chose to use a market research approach over 
using historical data because the authors stated that it 
                     
21 Table 2.2 of “Military Recruiting and Retention After the Fiscal 
Year 2000 Military Pay Legislation” by Asch, Hosek, Arkes, Fair, Sharp, 
and Totten provides additional information.   
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provided two distinct advantages: “First, NRC wants to know 
how to use larger financial incentives and new non-
financial incentives to expand its share of the employment 
market” (Kraus, Griffis, & Golfin, 2000). Analysis of new 
programs cannot be done using historical data. Second, the 
market research approach allowed the authors to collect 
information on young people who have not yet made an 
enlistment decision (Kraus, Griffis, & Golfin, 2000).  
 A “conjoint analysis” is “a marketing research tool 
that permits the user to analyze customer preferences among 
competing products” (Joles, Charbonneau, & Barr, 1998). A 
choice-based version has young people repeatedly select, 
from a short list, which enlistment package they would 
prefer. “The data generated from a survey allow inferences 
to be drawn about people’s preferences for different 
product attributes based on the choices they made on each 
task” (Kraus, Griffis, & Golfin 2000). 
 The survey was delivered in two mailings to 4,400 high 
school students and 600 community college students. In 
order to encourage response rates the authors offered a 
monetary incentive. The first mailing consisted of 1,500 
packets with a two-dollar incentive, 1000 packets with a 
one-dollar incentive and 500 packets with no incentive 
(Kraus, Griffis, & Golfin 2000). The authors decided to 
offer an incentive for all of the packets in the second 
mailing due to the low response rate of the no incentive 
group in the first mailing. The response rates are provided 





Table 21.   Survey response rates  
Incentive  
 No incentive $1 $2 Total 
Mailing 1 5.5% 12.5% 15.4% 11.0 
Mailing 2 - 10.2% 15.6% 12.9 
Total 5.5% 11.8% 15.5% 11.4%a 
aSeventy-seven of the 5000 packets were returned 
because they had incorrect addresses. Response rate 
based on 4923 packets. 
(Source: Kraus, Griffis, & Golfin 2000, Table 1)  
 
The authors observed that “the hypothetical enlistment 
packages in the survey had four different components: a 
Navy job, financial incentive, specified length of 
obligated service, and an amount of college credit that can 
be earned as a result of Navy training” (Kraus, Griffis, & 
Golfin, 2000). The levels were based on current and 
proposed enlistment incentive packages. The survey 
consisted of 20 tasks and in each task the respondents were 
asked to select one of three enlistment packages or to 
choose none. Choosing none indicated that none of the three 
packages would encourage the respondent to join the Navy. 
The survey also collected data to determine the 
respondent’s propensity to join the Navy. 
The first and last question of the survey asked the 
respondents: “How likely are you to serve in the Navy?” The 
responses choices were: definitely, probably, probably not, 
and definitely not (Kraus, Griffis, & Golfin 2000). The 
purpose of these questions was to determine the 
respondents’ propensity to join the Navy. The study used 
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three categories of propensity: High-propensity22, Medium-
propensity23, and No-propensity24. The objective of the study 
was to expand the Navy’s share of the employment market, so 
the authors wanted to focus on the preferences of the 
medium-propensity respondents. The medium-propensity 
respondents were considered to be sitting on the fence, but 
could be persuaded to join the Navy. The survey also asked 
the respondents questions to determine demographic 
characteristics and educational status. 
The high-propensity group was more likely to be male, 
younger than eighteen, and less likely to be college bound 
than the medium-propensity group. The No-propensity group 
was more likely to be female and slightly older than 
eighteen.25 
Once the survey data was collected a statistical model 
was used to estimate the probability of selecting one 
attribute over another. The statistical model used in this 
study was a conditional logit model. “What distinguishes 
this model from traditional regression models is that the 
behavior of interest, or the dependent variable, is 
characterized by a discrete rather than a continuous 
variable” (Kraus, Griffis, & Golfin, 2000). The authors 
state that the logit model estimates the effects of the 
                     
22 High-propensity respondents answered “definitely” or “probably” at 
the beginning and the end of survey. 
23 Medium-propensity respondents answered “probably not” or 
“definitely not” at the beginning and “definitely”, “probably”, or 
“probably not” at the end of the survey. 
24 No-propensity respondents answered “definitely not” at the end of 
the survey. 
25 Additional information on demographic characteristics can be found 
on page 17 of the study.  
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choices made by the respondents. The logit output for the 
model using the data from the medium-propensity respondents 
is shown in Table 22. The logit model “allowed the authors 
to adopt the assumption that people evaluate the overall 
attractiveness of a choice by summing the utilities 
associated with each of the attributes of the choice” 
(Kraus, Griffis, & Golfin, 2000). 
 
Table 22.   Logit output for medium-propensity26 
 Attribute-level Effect (std. dev.) 
1 Occupation Electronics -0.0224 (.04097) 
2 Computer  0.2466 (.03882)*** 
3 Engineering  0.1517 (.03956)*** 
4 Submarine -0.5304 (.4685)*** 
5 Aviation  0.1544 (.0454)*** 
6 Term length 4 years  0.6165 (.03180)*** 
7 5 years  0.2735 (.03355)*** 
8 6 years -0.1202 (.0365)*** 
9 8 years -0.7698 (.04417)*** 
10 Incentive 5K EB -0.6510 (.07252)*** 
11 10K EB -0.2783 (.06456)*** 
12 20K EB  0.1072 (.05806) 
13 30K EB  0.3156 (.05575)*** 
14 30K NCF -0.0101 (.05991) 
15 50K NCF  0.4080 (.05479)*** 
16 70K EB  0.6433 (.05271)*** 
17 10K EB & 40K NCF  0.5468 (.05384)*** 
18   No incentive -1.0815 (.08510)*** 
                     
26 The estimated effects of the sum of the attributes in each 
category equal zero. For example, if you added the estimated effects of 
the attributes under occupation they would equal zero.  
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 Attribute-level Effect (std. dev.) 
19  College credit <1 semester -0.3842 (.04487)*** 
20 1 semester -0.1743 (.04236)*** 
21 2 semesters -0.0608 (.04146) 
22 3 semesters  0.2258 (.03896)*** 
23 4 semesters  0.3936 (.04041)*** 
24  None option None  0.7271 (.03313)*** 
*** indicates significance at the .01 level 
(Source: Kraus, Griffis, & Golfin, 2000, Table 7)  
 
Once the logit model has been estimated the utilities 
of the attributes in the enlistment packages are totaled. 
An enlistment package consists of an occupation, term of 
service, incentive, and college credit earned. “The next 
step was to exponentiate the total utility values for each 
enlistment package” (Kraus, Griffis, & Golfin, 2000). This 
value will be used to calculate the predicted probability 
of choice. An example of how the study calculated the 
predicted probabilities of choice is shown in Table 23.  
 
Table 23.   Calculating predicted probabilities of 
choice 








Computer .247 Submarine -0.530 
4 years .616 6 years -0.120 
$20K EB .107 $50K NCF .408 
3 semesters .226 <1 semester -0.384 
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Total package 
value – Ui 1.196 
Total package 
value – Ui -0.626 









 (Source: Kraus, Griffis, & Golfin, 2000, Table 6) 
 
If the respondents were forced to pick between the two 
enlistment packages in Table 23, 86 percent of the 
respondents would select enlistment package 1 according to 
the model. The survey had the respondents select from three 
enlistment packages and a "none" option. The method used to 
calculate the predicted probabilities of choice would be 
the same except there would be two additional enlistment 
packages to calculate.  
The study focused on the medium-propensity and high-
propensity respondents. The reasoning was that high-
propensity respondents were more likely to join the service 
and medium-propensity respondents were the people that the 
Navy needed to attract to increase its recruiting market. 
The results were tabulated by using the calculated 
probability of choice to compare the trade-offs between 
different levels of an attribute. 
The Navy College Fund (NCF) was found to be more than 
twice as popular as an EB of the same actuarial cost to the 
Navy. The NCF was also found to be more effective for 
medium-propensity respondents than high-propensity 
respondents (Kraus, Griffis, & Golfin, 2000). The relative 
preferences for actuarially equivalent incentives for 
 43
medium-propensity respondents are shown in Figure 4.27 When 
given the choice between a $5K EB and a $40K NCF 70 percent 
would choose the $40K NCF as shown in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Relative preferences for actuarially equivalent 
incentives (EB vs. NCF) 
(Source: Kraus, Griffis, & Golfin, 2000, Figure 7) 
  
The authors demonstrated that enlistment bonuses could 
be used to channel enlistees into critical enlistment 
programs. The authors did this by calculating the 
probability of choice for the five occupations used in the 
survey. The authors then calculated the amount of 
enlistment bonus required to yield equal probabilities of 
choice for each occupation. The probability of choice for 
the occupations is shown in Figure 5. When given the choice 
to select one of the five occupations 30 percent of the 
high-propensity respondents would select the computer field 
and 11 percent would select the submarine field, as shown 
in Figure 5. The enlistments bonuses required to level the 
                     
27 The study does not state how the authors determined that a $5K EB 
cost the Navy the same amount of money as a $40K NCF. A large portion 
of the 40K comes from the Montgomery GI Bill that all enlistees are 
entitled to. The authors may have also factored in the savings from 
service personnel never using the college fund.   
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playing field among the occupations are shown in Figure 6. 
The ability to estimate the required enlistment bonus to 
level the playing field among occupations could be useful 
in determining monetary incentives for critically short 
enlistment programs. The submarine occupation requires a 
29K EB to yield the same probability of enlistments as a 
computer occupation with a 5K EB among the high-propensity 
group, as shown in Figure 6. The studies claim that 
occupations are more important to high-propensity 
respondents than medium-propensity respondents are 
supported in Figure 5 and Figure 6.         
 
 
Figure 5.   Probabilities of choice for occupation 





Figure 6.   Enlistment bonuses that yield equal 
probabilities of choice 
(Source: (Kraus, Griffis, & Golfin, 2000, Figure 12) 
  
The study also compared the trade-offs between 
offering larger enlistment bonuses and increasing the 
length of obligated service. A six-year term required a 
$20K EB to yield the same probability of choice as a four-
year term with a $5K EB among medium-propensity 
respondents. The cost per year for a four-year term was 
$1250 per year and the cost for a six-year term was $3333 
per year. The trade-offs between larger EBs and one 
additional year of service for the medium-propensity group 




Figure 7.   Trade-offs between EBs and service terms 
(Source: (Kraus, Griffis, & Golfin, 2000, Figure 10) 
 
 The study also calculated the probability of choice 
for college credit earned through Navy training. The study 
stated that earning college credit was more important to 
medium-propensity respondents than high-propensity 
respondents. The study found that offering appropriate 
college credit for Navy training had a large positive 
effect on enlistment propensity (about 3 percent) and 
increasing obligations by just one year had a substantial 
negative effect on enlistment propensity (about 2 
percentage points) (Kraus, Griffis, & Golfin, 2000). The 
study recommended offering college-related incentives and 
short obligations to target medium propensity youth (Kraus, 
Griffis, & Golfin, 2000). 
 The results and findings of the study led to some 
broad recommendations. The study provides some useful 
insight on what type of enlistment packages would be 
preferred by the respondents, but it does not state that 
offering a certain EB or NCF would increase or decrease 
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enlistments by a given percentage. The authors stated that 
they could predict enlistment propensity, but not the 
changes in the number of enlistments. This study was 
limited to five military occupations, however; actual 
enlistees have many occupations to choose from. 
Incorporating all of the occupations into the survey would 
have increased the complexity of the study. The estimations 
of this study were based on survey results from 497 
respondents with 243 respondents considered to be medium-
propensity and 43 respondents considered to be high-
propensity respondents. The authors state that the 
estimates for the medium-propensity respondents were 
significant at the 1 percent level, but the authors do not 
comment on the significance level of the estimations for 
high-propensity respondents. The study did a lot of 
comparisons between the medium-propensity and high-
propensity without commenting on the significance of the 
estimates for the high-propensity respondents.  
 In all, the study demonstrated that the choice-based 
conjoint analysis can be an effective tool in estimating 
relative preferences. The ability to calculate the 
incentives required to level the playing field among 
occupations or terms would be beneficial to the Marine 
Corps. The authors also demonstrated how the market 
research approach allows researchers to analyze new and 
existing incentives. This would be beneficial when trying 
to expand the recruiting market. 
 Another study (An Enlistment Bonus Distribution Model 
1988) conducted by Joles, Charboneau, and Barr used choice-
based conjoint analysis to develop an optimization model. 
The objective was to use a mixed-integer programming model 
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to assist decision-makers in the efficient and effective 
allocation of EB incentives (Joles, Charbonneau, & Barr, 
1998). 
 This study used a survey conducted by the Urban 
Studies Institute at the University of Louisville. “In 1996 
the Army recruiting command contracted the University to 
conduct a conjoint analysis study in order to better 
understand the relationship of a mix of attributes in 
recruitment packages” (Joles, Charbonneau, & Barr, 1998). 
The Urban Studies Institute subcontracted with malls in 
several cities to conduct mall-intercept surveys (Joles, 
Charbonneau, & Barr, 1998). The authors stated that the 
data obtained from the study demonstrated the potential of 
choice-based analysis, but could not be used to make 
reliable estimations of youth preferences. 
 The authors stated that non-feasible incentives were 
offered and it was not clear if the subjects or even the 
survey administrators understood the various enlistment 
alternatives (Joles, Charbonneau, & Barr, 1998). The 
authors also stated that illogical inferences were drawn 
from the data collected (analysis suggests, for example 
that, for an equivalent incentive package and MOS, 
applicants would prefer a five-year term over a four-year 
term) (Joles, Charbonneau, & Barr, 1998). In addition, the 
survey consisted of only seven MOS choices. 
 The authors went ahead and developed an optimization 
model to demonstrate the capability of integer programming 
to predict optimal enlistment incentives. The software 
available in this study limited the number of variables 
that could be used. The available software and the lack of 
adequate data prevented the authors from developing a model 
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that could predict optimal solutions. For this reason, this 
study will not go into the details of the optimization 
model used. 
 This study demonstrates the difficulty in obtaining 
accurate survey data. One of the many challenges in 
collecting survey data from the civilian population is the 
lack of knowledge of military programs. Participants 
understand the different lengths of terms, and college 
program versus enlistment bonus, but occupational choices 
can be more challenging. The study also shows that time and 
resources invested in surveys can produce less than desired 
results. This is another reason that some researchers 
prefer to use historical data when analyzing enlistment 
incentives. 
C. HISTORICAL DATA 
 Researchers have used various regression analysis 
methods to analyze the cost effectiveness and to estimate 
the increase in accessions due to monetary incentives. The 
pay elasticity approach is a common method used by 
researchers to determine cost effectiveness and gains in 
accessions due to monetary incentives. Researches also use 
regression models to analyze the variation in monetary 
incentives. This allows researchers to estimate the effect 
that increasing the value or allocations of an enlistment 
bonus will have on a particular enlistment program.  
1. Pay Elasticity 
  As discussed previously, Catherine Palomba conducted a 
study on Marine Corps enlistment bonuses in 1983, and in 
addition to analyzing survey data, the study used pay 
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elasticity to determine the effect of enlistment bonuses. 
The study estimated the effects of the TB and CB bonus on 
enlistments in FY 1979. The author chose FY 1979 because 
the survey data was collected in 1979 (Palomba, 1983). 
 The objective was to determine how many enlistments 
were gained due to enlistment bonuses. The author started 
by stating that the most recent estimates of pay elasticity 
for the Marine Corps were in the range of .5 to .7 (Palomba 
1983).28 Then the study determined the increment to pay 
which, if received over 4 years, would have the same 
discounted present value as the discounted present value of 
the bonus (Palomba 1983). The pay increment was added to FY 
1979 military and civilian pay figures to determine the 
effect of the bonus on the military-to-civilian pay ratio. 
Then the pay increment was multiplied by the pay elasticity 
to obtain estimates of the enlistment supply effects 
(Palomba 1983). The study chose to use .5 and 1 as the pay 
elasticity for the Marine Corps. Assuming pay elasticity 
equals 1, the estimated percentage increase in enlistments 
were 0.69 percent for the TB and 0.84 percent for the CB. 
The estimated percentage increase in enlistments was used 
to calculate the number of new enlistments per 100 bonuses. 
The calculations used to estimate the number of enlistments 
per 100 bonuses is shown in Table 24. The TB resulted in an 
additional 7 enlistments per 100 bonuses and the CB 
resulted in an additional 12 enlistments per 100 bonuses as 
shown in Table 24. Using a pay elasticity of .5 would 
result in 3 to 4 new enlistments for the TB and 6 new 
enlistments for the CB.  
                     
28 The author referenced a CNA study conducted in 1981. 
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TB 10,000 .69% 69 1,000 7 
2500 
CB 10,000 .84% 84 700 12 
The calculations were made using pay elasticity equals 1. 
(Source: Palomba, Table c-2) 
 
 The pay elasticity method used in this study supports 
the results of previous studies that suggest that monetary 
incentives do not have a large impact on Marine Corps 
enlistments. What the estimates do not show is the effect 
the bonus had on channeling enlistees into the bonus 
programs. The method also limits itself by looking at only 
one year. Looking at more than one year may have produced 
different results. 
2. Multiple Regression Analysis 
 John Warner, Curtis Simon and Deborah Payne conducted 
a study in 2001 that analyzed the college fund and other 
enlistment incentives. Data for all four services was 
collected for the period FY 1987 through FY 1996. This 
research stated that during the time period studied, less 
than 10 percent of Marine Corps enlistees received an 
enlistment bonus and less than 5 percent benefitted from 
 52
the Marine Corps College Fund. (Warner, Simon, and Payne, 
2001). Since the incentive program in the Marine Corps was 
relatively small over the time period studied, the authors 
stated that it was not feasible to obtain precise estimates 
of the effects (Warner, Simon, and Payne, 2001). 
 In Chapter 7 of the study the authors looked at the 
skill-channeling effects of enlistment bonuses. The authors 
used multiple regression analysis to evaluate the 
enlistment effects of a MOS being eligible or ineligible 
for a monetary incentive. At the time this study was 
conducted, Army enlistees could not receive both an 
enlistment bonus and Army college fund benefit. The 
analysis of skill channeling used 10 years of data and 
within this period there were 16 period-to-period policy 
combinations (Warner, Simon, and Payne, 2001).29 The number 
of cells and contracts in each category are provided in 
Table 25. Each cell represented a combination of MOS and 
term of service. “Cells that had fewer than five contracts 
were excluded from the database to eliminate scale effects 
of small cells” (Warner, Simon, and Payne, 2001). This 








                     
29 “Example of policy combinations: ACF-on to ACF-off, EB-on to EB-
off, ACF-on to EB-on, and so on.” (Warner, Simon, and Payne 2001) 
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Table 25.   Incentive Frequencies (FY 1987-96 Data) 
 
(Source: Warner, Simon, and Payne, 2001, Table 7.1)  
    
 The authors used two multiple regression models. In 
both models the percent change in contracts was the 
dependent variable. “The first model estimates the effects 
of program changes using dummy variables for each change as 
explanatory variables” (Warner, Simon, and Payne 2001). The 
second model includes the changes in the values of the 
bonuses. “The Army changed enlistment incentive options 39 
times between FY87 and FY96” (Warner, Simon, and Payne 
2001). Both models included two control variables. The 
number of days in each period was not equal, so a variable 
representing the percent change in the number of days was 
included. There was also a variable to control for the 
effect of overall recruiting. The estimated effects for the 




Table 26.   Model percent change in number of contracts 
              
(Source: Warner, Simon, and Payne, 2001, Table 7.3) 
 
 The coefficient estimates the percentage change in 
enlistments for a particular policy change. For example the 
neither to ACF change would result in a 50.8 percent 
increase in contracts. A majority of the coefficients were 
significant, but the R2 was only 22.2 percent, so there is a 
lot of variability that this model does not explain. 
Furthermore, the results are vague on what MOS and term of 
service they represent. Each category groups all of the 
MOSs and terms of service together. The model shows how 
policy change can effect enlistments, but presumably a 
policy change could affect each MOS differently. The model 
should have been run for each specific MOS to provide the 
 55
estimated effects of policy change for that particular MOS. 
As stated previously the authors used a second model that 
includes the changes in incentive levels. The results of 
the second model are provided in Table 27. 
 











(Source: Warner, Simon, and Payne, 2001, Table 7.3) 
 
 The coefficients for the second model show that a 
$1000 increase in enlistment bonus or college fund would 
result in a 7 percent change in enlistment. This model has 
some of the same problems as the first model. As in the 
previous model, the R2 is low and the model does not 
estimate the change in value for each specific MOS. Each 
MOS and term of service could have a different utility 
value. The estimates are too broad to apply the theory of 
substitution. The theory of substitution is that a person 
could be willing to sacrifice one economic good (desired 
MOS) to obtain more of other economic goods (enlistment 
bonus). 
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 Harold Larson also used regression analysis on 
historical data in 1995 to analyze Army enlistment bonuses. 
The study analyzed eight different MOS categories over six 
fiscal years (1988-1993). The goal was to determine the 
optimal enlistment bonus to offer for each MOS category. 
The methodology used by the author was called a linear 
spline with one knot. 
 The linear spline with one knot is a straight line 
which has been bent at one location (the knot). The knot 
was considered to be the optimal value for an enlistment 
bonus. The author used a simple model. The dependent 
variable was the average number of contracts per day for 
the month and the explanatory variable was the CPI-adjusted 
enlistment bonus. Using this method to estimate the effects 
of enlistment bonuses requires a large variance in 
enlistment bonuses offered. 
 There were several different bonus amounts offered 
during the time period of the sample. For example the 
infantry MOS offered bonuses ranging from $3000 to $8000. 
To ensure that bonuses were the same for each period, the 
time frame used was broken down into 28 periods. The 
periods varied from 26 to 171 days. Since the number of 
days and contracts varied per period the author weighted 
the values in the model. “The weights applied were 
estimated from the observed data by the reciprocals of the 
standard errors of the mean number of contracts per month” 
(Larson, 1995). Then the author ran a regression for each 
of the eight different MOSs. The regressions included all 
contracts for the given MOS, not just the contracts that 
were assigned bonuses. F-tests were used to determine the 
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significance of the estimations.30 Appendix B of “Analysis 
of Recruiting Bonus Payments” provides the details of the 
Methodology used.  
 The model does not seem to account for external 
factors that would influence the estimates. The author does 
not state how the study accounted for the number of 
contracts at each bonus level. For example, if there were 
one hundred $8000 enlistment bonuses and there were ten 
thousand $3000 enlistment bonuses, the smaller bonus would 
naturally result in more contracts. The recommended bonus 
values are equal to the median value as shown in Table 28 
and Table 29. The study also does not account for the time 
period in which the bonuses were offered. Larger bonuses 
are typically awarded during periods of difficulty in 
recruiting.  
  
Table 28.    Summary statistics for knot values 





11X 2915.18 3.28 2915.45 2908.14 2918.29 
13B 3468.61 672.98 3145.36 2901.35 4569.32 
13M 2357.99 413.17 2252.25 1917.55 3371.87 
16S 1092.61 601.97 967.12 967.12 1470.59 
19D 3145.62 504.56 3243.74 2085.51 3751.34 
63B 2615.41 145.60 2729.26 2310.54 2729.26 
63T 2324.82 370.33 2169.20 2143.62 3234.75 
94B 2295.66 1065.29 1497.01 1485.15 4338.39 
 
(Source: Larson 1995, Table 4) 
 
 
                     
30 Appendix B of “Analysis of Recruiting Bonus Payments” by Harold 
Larson provides the details of the methodology used.  
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Table 29.   Recommended four-year bonus values 
MOS Amount Comments 
11X $2915 Very strong recommendation 
13B $3145 Strong recommendation 
13M $2252 Strong recommendation 
16S - Not appropriate model 
19D $3244 Weak recommendation 
63B $2729 Moderately strong recommendation
63T - Not appropriate model 
94B $1497 Weak recommendation 
(Source: Larson 1995, Table 5) 
 
D. SUMMARY 
 As shown in this chapter researchers have used 
different methods to analyze monetary incentives. The 
methodology of choice depends on the objective and the 
resources available.  
 Surveys are beneficial when trying to infer what 
decisions individuals would make when new incentives are 
incorporated or in the absence of current incentives. As 
shown in the “Choice-Based Conjoint Study of Recruitment 
Incentives,” using civilian youth as survey participants is 
informative when trying to expand the recruiting market. 
Survey data from military enlistees is beneficial when 
trying to estimate how to channel enlistees into critically 
short enlistment programs. The downfalls to survey data are 
that it is not always readily available and collecting 
survey data can be time-intensive and costly.  
 Historical data is typically more accessible and it 
provides researchers with real-life decisions with binding 
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actions. Historical data can be beneficial when trying to 
estimate cost-effectiveness and enlistments gained due to 
monetary incentives. The pay elasticity approach is a 
method preferred by researchers when estimating cost 
effectiveness. Combined with multiple regression analysis, 
historical data can be used to estimate what incentives 
were preferred by enlistees. If there is adequate variance 
in the data, multiple regression analysis could be used to 
estimate the optimal value of enlistment bonuses. 
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IV. DATA 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the data 
used in this research and explain the process for selecting 
the variables. Additionally, a preliminary analysis will 
examines the applicability of using the data to effectively 
estimate the optimal incentive for enlistment bonuses. The 
analysis also tries to identify any factors that might 
influence the effectiveness of the enlistment bonus (EB) 
program.   
A. DATA SOURCES 
The recruiting data used in this research was obtained 
from two sources. The first source was the Total Force Data 
Warehouse (TFDW), and the second source was the Marine 
Corps Recruiting Command (MCRC).  
1. TFDW & MCRC 
The recruiting data consisted of cross-sectional and 
time series data. The Marine Corps Recruiting Information 
Support System (MCRISS) supplies the recruiting data to the 
TFDW and it is captured in a monthly “snap shot.” The TFDW 
started receiving MCRISS data in July of 2004; data prior 
to this was compiled from the previous database.31 Data from 
fiscal year (FY) 2004 to present is the most accurate, but 
there was sufficient data in the TFDW to go back to FY 
2000. The TFDW is missing a large amount of recruiting data 
before FY 2000, so this research used recruiting data only 
from FY 2000 through FY 2007. 
                     
31 As reported by a Marine Corps representative who manages the TFDW 
at HQMC. 
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MCRC was used to collect information on the annual 
recruiting mission, number of enlistment programs and 
bonuses allocated, and the qualification requirements for 
enlistment programs. MCRC was also limited on how far back 
it could provide recruiting data, but it was able to 
provide data from FY 2000 through FY 2007. 
B. VARIABLES 
The variables selected from the TFDW are shown in 
Table 30. This research chose to use the date on which 
enlistees shipped to recruit training instead of the date 
they enlisted in the delayed entry program (DEP). This was 
done to reduce the number of duplicate records. It is less 
likely that a recruit be discharged from recruit training 
and contracted again in the same FY than for an enlistee to 
be discharged from the DEP and contracted again in the same 
FY. The data was also restricted to active duty enlistees. 
A description of the Marine Corps enlistment program codes 
is provided in Table 31. 
 
Table 30.   TFDW VARIABLES 
TFDW VARIABLES 
APPLICANT_ID Number assigned to enlistee 
SKILL_PROGRAM Enlistment program assigned to enlistee 
TERM_OF_ENLISTMENT Length of obligated service 
EB_PROGRAM Enlistment bonus assigned to enlistee 
EB_AMT Amount of enlistment bonus 
SHIPPING_BONUS Amount of shipping bonus 
EDUC_ALLOW Education incentive 
STUDENT_LN Student loan payoff program 
MCCF_PROGRAM Marine Corps College Fund 
AFQT_SCORE AFQT Score 
EL Electronics Score 
GT General technical knowledge score  
MM Mechanical score 
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TFDW VARIABLES 
CL Clerical score 
EDUCATION_ CODE Enlistee education level 
FY Fiscal year enlistee shipped to recruit 
training 
SHIP_DATE Date enlistee shipped to recruit 
training 
MARITAL_STATUS Enlistee marital status 
GENDER Enlistee gender 
EDUCATION_TIER Education tier 
COMPONENT_CODE  Active or Reserve 
(Source: HQMC, M&RA, TFDW, MCRISS) 
 
 
Table 31.   Enlistment Programs 
ENLISTMENT PROGRAMS 
AE Aviation Support 
AF Aviation Mechanic 
AG Aircrew/ Flight Mechanic/ Navigator 
AJ Aviation Operations 
B5 Managerial Option 
B6 Ground Option 
B7 Electronic/ Data Option 
B8 Mechanical Option 
BA Aviation Electronic Technician 
BX Data Systems 
BY Electronics Maintenance 
CA Transportation Option 
CB Legal and Administration 
CC Supply and Accounting 
CD Equipment/ Vehicle Repair 
CE Combat Support 
CF Ordnance Technician/ Metal Works 
CG Public Affairs 
CH Media Option 
CJ Logistics Option 
CK Fire Direction/ Control Specialist 
CL Combat Vehicle Repair 
CM Construction/ Utilities 
CN Service Management 
DB Command and Control/ Electrician 
DC Cryptologic Linguist 




G6 Food Service Option 
H1 Arabic Linguist 
H2 Arabic Linguist 
HD National Call to Service 
OO Open Contract 
U2 Musician Enlistment Option 
UH Infantry Option 
UJ Nuclear, Biological and Chemical 
UT Military Police & Correction 
UV Marine Corps Security Forces 
UW Marine Corps Security Forces (PRP) 
UZ Marine Recon 
YW Presidential Support/ Special Weapon Section 
(Source: MCO 1130.53, Enlistment Option Programs) 
 
 
 C. ANALYSIS OF DATA 
1. Predicting the Optimal Incentive for an 
Enlistment Bonus 
The data obtained from the TFDW and the MCRC cannot be 
used to effectively estimate the optimal value of an 
enlistment bonus. First, historical data on Marine Corps EB 
program is limited. Second, until recently, only a limited 
number of enlistment programs qualified for an EB and the 
Marine Corps EB budget has been relatively small, making it 
difficult to estimate the effects of the EB program, as 








Figure 8.   Enlistment  Bonus Budget 
 
(Source: HQMC, M&RA, Enlisted Plans Section) 
 
Third, there is not enough variation in amounts used 
in the EB program to statistically compare the results of 
the bonuses. In FY 2000, six enlistment programs qualified 
for an EB. The value of the EB for those enlistment 
programs neither increased nor decreased from FY 2000 
through FY 2007, as shown in Table 32. The Marine Corps did 
increase the number of enlistment programs qualified for an 
EB in FY 2005, but there still has not been enough 
variation to effectively estimate the optimal bonus amount. 
The data used in this research may not support a multiple 
regression analysis to estimate the effects of the EB 
program, but the data can be used to identify relationships 
inherent in the recruiting data.  
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Table 32.   Marine Corps Enlistment Bonuses 
Number of Bonuses allocated 
Bonus 
prg/value Percentage of Bonuses used 
Enlistment 
prg FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07
BZ/5000 431 500 529 578 412 644 533 350 
BY 91% 73% 78% 104% 94% 79% 92% 98% 
E1/4000 85 120 118 124 108 134 155 109 
AJ 91% 105% 69% 108% 91% 102% 99% 92% 
E3/4000 15 15 12 35 18 31 36 201 
CG 33% 33% 92% 97% 94% 87% 97% 98% 
E4/6000 187 210 196 178 143 192 201 201 
CK 79% 53% 80% 110% 90% 95% 97% 98% 
E6/4000 24 50 50 101 71 106 104 125 
DC 100% 60% 114% 97% 97% 85% 89% 90% 
E7/3000 539 650 594 490 475 543 554 204 
BA 86% 67% 99% 109% 97% 99% 98% 95% 
*NA/5000      60 171 103 
HD      148% 101% 92% 
     60 54 72 NB/student 
ln payoff 
($10K)      27% 52% 21% 
     60 35 78 NC/12 month 
educ allow      25% 23% 12% 
     60 48 85 ND/36 mnth 
educ allow      30% 44% 20% 
UZ/10000       402 416 
UZ       100% 100% 
X1/10000        1028 
B7,CA,CC,DB        90% 
**F1/5000        182 
CA        100% 
**F2/5000        197 
CC        100% 
F3/5000        260 
CJ        94% 
F4/6000        154 
DD        106% 
M1/10000        35 
M1        97% 
 
Blank cells: Enlistment bonus was not available for that FY. 
* NA, NB, NC are all bonus programs for enlistment program HD.   
** Initial allocations for F1 was 480 and F2 was 409. Allocations 
not already assigned to an enlistee were deleted when the X1 
program was incorporated in the summer of FY 2007.   
(Source: MCRC, End of FY recruiting report) 
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2. Meeting Enlistment Program Requirements 
The Marine Corps EB program remained unchanged for 
several years as shown in Figure 8 and Table 32. The lack 
of variation led to a review of the EB program to see what 
effect, if any, not changing the EB program had on the 
Marine Corps meeting individual enlistment program 
requirements. The percentage of the required enlistment 
programs attained and the number of enlistment programs 
over or below the requirement are shown in Table 33 and 
Table 34. 
 
Table 33.   Percentage of Marine Corps Enlistment 
Programs attained 
Percentage of enlistment programs attained 
Program FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 AVG
HD   89 68 68 45 68
CC 100 98 56 68 65 57 87 76 76
G6 83 85 92 70 75 75 105 90 84
B7   85 87 90 87
B6   72 97 92 87
CA 94 85 83 101 86 72 93 94 88
BY 90 99 100 101 95 84 88 75 92
UZ 78  100 100 93
X1   93 93
CG 85 114 90 106 81 94 88 87 93
CJ 95 90 97 96 92 88 97 91 93
UJ 87 97 99 102 92 90 97 96 95
DB 101 95 92 105 96 83 97 93 95
B8   91 100 99 97
CK 95 88 93 110 101 96 97 99 97
DC 111 101 100 105 101 84 90 89 98
AE 100 99 100 98 98 96 99 97 98
CL 104 93 95 108 96 98 99 99 99
B5   104 100 97 100
UW   100 100 106 99 100 98 101
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Percentage of enlistment programs attained 
Program FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 AVG
CM 98 91 100 109 107 100 101 100 101
CD 99 99 99 106 102 102 100 100 101
CB 102 109 97 105 97 101 99 100 101
AF 103 100 103 110 97 100 101 100 102
UT 101 106 104 109 100 96 99 99 102
UV 104 100 100 100 108 100 101 102 102
UH 102 108 101 100 104 101 100 101 102
CF 99 95 100 108 113 104 101 100 103
BA 96 103 100 109 98 118 98 99 103
BX 107 103 121 110 100 96 98 98 104
CN 100 105 101 110 107 107 100 104 104
CE 100 105 102 112 105 113 102 100 105
CH 114 119 118 100 94 89 107 101 105
AJ 99 100 100 110 100 139 100 97 106
AG 104 102 100 110 97 133 100 99 106
DD 105 106 102 120 116 100 101 100 106
Blank cells: Enlistment program not available for that FY. 
Percentages have been rounded to 0 decimal points. 
(Source: MCRC, End of FY recruiting report) 
 
 
Table 34.   Number of Marine Corps Enlistment Programs 
short or over annual requirement 
Number of enlistment programs +/- annual requirement 
Program FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 AVG 
CC 3 -24 -527 -333 -362 -471 -104 -309 -266
CA -100 -263 -321 9 -224 -495 -88 -103 -198
DB 11 -83 -163 91 -82 -341 -38 -128 -92
B7   -48 -103 -85 -79
BY -94 -10 2 10 -33 -143 -101 -228 -75
X1   -70 -70
CJ -46 -100 -37 -42 -81 -129 -32 -74 -68
B6   -91 -21 -83 -65
G6 -89 -59 -15 -114 -94 -97 14 -51 -63
HD   -19 79 -110 -191 -60
UZ -69  1 1 -22
AE 0 -13 0 -21 -18 -37 -6 -20 -14
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Number of enlistment programs +/- annual requirement 
Program FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 AVG 
B8   -29 0 -8 -12
CK -18 -39 -23 29 2 -14 -9 -2 -9
UJ -18 -5 -2 4 -17 -23 -6 -7 -9
CG -9 10 -8 4 -15 -6 -13 -12 -6
DC 19 1 0 12 2 -31 -19 -28 -6
CL 11 -19 -17 22 -10 -5 -3 -3 -3
B5   13 4 -24 -2
UW   -2 29 -4 1 -9 3
CH 11 13 13 0 -4 -8 5 1 4
CD -10 -13 -14 64 -17 29 2 -2 5
CM -26 -116 2 108 81 4 12 -2 8
CF -3 -17 1 31 50 14 3 1 10
UT 12 38 25 53 -1 -30 -4 -12 10
UV 41 1 1 -1 46 -2 5 13 13
AJ -3 2 1 29 1 110 0 -11 16
BX 35 14 104 46 -1 -30 -10 -12 18
AG 14 8 1 33 -10 96 0 5 18
CB 40 153 -52 84 -46 15 -7 1 24
DD 26 24 8 81 70 -2 3 -3 26
CN 3 30 5 60 40 43 1 28 26
AF 48 2 52 154 -52 8 11 2 28
BA -65 46 1 108 -25 228 -29 -6 32
CE 0 48 23 104 46 125 15 3 46
UH 118 466 35 -31 266 115 2 49 128
(Source: MCRC, End of FY recruiting report) 
 
 
The first step was to look at the enlistment programs 
in Table 33 that offered an enlistment bonus. This study 
chose to focus on the six enlistment programs that offered 
a bonus from FY 2000 through FY 2007: AJ, BA, BY, CG, CK, 
and DC. The value of the bonus for each enlistment program 
is shown in Table 32. The percentage of enlistment programs 
attained is shown in Table 35. 
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Table 35.   Percentage of Enlistment Programs attained 
for EB programs     
 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 AVG 
BY 90% 99% 100% 101% 95% 84% 88% 75% 92%
CG 85% 114% 90% 106% 81% 94% 88% 87% 93%
CK 95% 88% 93% 110% 101% 96% 97% 99% 97%
DC 111% 101% 100% 105% 101% 84% 90% 89% 98%
BA 96% 103% 100% 109% 98% 118% 98% 99% 103%
AJ 99% 100% 100% 110% 100% 139% 100% 97% 106%
(Source: MCRC, End of FY recruiting report) 
 
Table 35 shows that four of the six enlistment 
programs attained an average of 97 percent or more of the 
annual requirement. The AJ program qualified for a $4000 
bonus and had the highest average, as shown in Table 32 and 
Table 35. The BY program qualified for a $5000 bonus and 
had the lowest average. Actually the BY program filled a 
majority of its annual requirement in FY00 through FYO4, 
but in FY05 the BY program began to fall short of the 
requirement. In addition, some of the other programs began 
to fall short of the requirement after FY05, as shown in 
Table 35. This may have been due to the Marine Corps 
increasing the number of enlistment programs qualified for 
an enlistment bonus in FY05 through FY07. Alternatively, 
perhaps the bonus may not have been seen to be as 
attractive as it had been in previous years. The next step 
was to look at the enlistment programs that failed to meet 
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the annual requirement over multiple years. There were 
numerous programs that were a few percentage points short, 
so this research focused on programs that were below 90 
percent for multiple years. Five enlistment programs that 
consistently fell short of the annual requirement were 
identified: CA, CC, G6, HD, & B7. The percentage of the 
annual requirement attained for these enlistment programs 
is shown in Table 36. 
 
Table 36.   Enlistment Programs identified as 
consistently not meeting annual requirement 
 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 AVG 
HD   89% 68% 68% 45% 68%
CC 100% 98% 56% 69% 66% 57% 87% 76% 76%
G6 83% 85% 92% 70% 75% 75% 105% 90% 84%
B7   84% 86% 90% 87%
CA 94% 85% 83% 101% 86% 72% 93% 94% 89%
Blank cells: Enlistment program not available for that FY. 
(Source: MCRC, End of FY recruiting report) 
 
The enlistment programs CA, CC, and B7 were not 
qualified for a monetary incentive until FY07. Enlistment 
program G6 was never qualified for an enlistment incentive 
and HD was always qualified for an enlistment incentive.  
The CA, CC, and G6 programs consistently fell short of the 
annual requirement during the time period that the Marine 
Corps EB program remained unchanged (FY00-FY05). In FY02 
only 56 percent of the requirement for CC enlistment 
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programs was attained; that meant the Marine Corps was 
short 527 enlistees in the CC program as shown in Table 34. 
In the following years the CC program continued to fall 
significantly short of the Marine Corps requirement. In 
FY05 the CA enlistment program was short 495 enlistees as 
shown in Table 34. That is a significant number of 
enlistees to be short in one enlistment program. 
The Marine Corps also enlists around 1500 to 2000 
recruits as open contracts each year; these recruits are 
assigned to enlistment programs that are critically short. 
The recruits enlisted as open contracts are not always 
qualified for the enlistment programs that are critically 
short. These include the CC and B7 enlistment programs, in 
which just over 50 percent of all enlistees meet the line 
score requirements (see Table 37). 
     
Table 37.   Enlistment Program line Score Requirements     
Prg GT MM EL CL 
%enlistees 
qualified Prg GT MM EL CL 
%enlistees 
qualified 
UH 80    100.0% CD  95   71.2% 
CN    90 97.3% CM  95   71.2% 
CA  85   96.1% BA   105  60.3% 
CE 90    94.6% AJ 105    59.9% 
G6 90    94.6% CG 105    59.9% 
UV 90    94.6% CK 105    59.9% 
CF 95    87.0% DC 105    59.9% 
DB   95  86.6% AE 105 95   59.2% 
B5    100 74.3% AF  105   59.1% 
CL    100 74.3% B8  105   59.1% 
B6 100    73.5% CL  105   59.1% 
CH 100    73.5% CC    105 56.2% 
CJ 100    73.5% B7 105  105  51.9% 
DD 100    73.5% BY   110  44.3% 
PR 100    73.5% BX 110    44.1% 
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Prg GT MM EL CL 
%enlistees 
qualified Prg GT MM EL CL 
%enlistees 
qualified 
UT 100    73.5% UJ 110    44.1% 
UW 100    73.5% AG 110 105   41.2% 
* This chart was computed by using the percentage of FY05-07 enlistees 
qualified for enlistment program. 
** This chart only considers line score requirements for qualification. There 
are several other factors in determining qualification for an enlistment 
program.  
*** Percentages have been rounded to one decimal point. 
 




Additionally, over 50 percent of the recruits enlisted 
as open contracts are “bravos”32 and several of the 
enlistment programs that are critically short have a low 
percentage of “bravos” assigned to them as shown in Table 
38. For example around 2 percent of the enlistees assigned 
to the CC and BY enlistment programs were “bravos”. Relying 
on open contracts to fill critically short enlistment 
programs could leave some enlistment programs short of 
enough qualified enlistees. 
This study did not have sufficient data to determine 
if critically short enlistment programs were still short 
after the enlistees with open contracts were assigned an 
enlistment program. However, considering that around 50 
percent of open contracts are “bravos,” enlistment programs 
with a small pool of qualified applicants should rely less 
on open contracts to fulfill program requirements. 
 
 
                     
32 Bravo means that the enlistee’s AFQT score was less than 50.  
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Table 38.   Percentage of Bravos 
Program 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total  34.3 35.1 32.9 31.3 29.8 31.7 32.4 34.9
BX 1.2 1.0 1.7 0.8 0.8 1.3 0.3 1.1
CG 0.0 0.0 2.8 1.3 0.0 1.0 2.2 1.2
UJ 2.7 0.9 3.4 0.5 0.5 1.9 0.9 1.4
CC 17.5 18.9 7.1 0.6 2.8 2.5 0.7 1.9
AG 2.8 3.9 1.7 1.7 0.5 2.1 1.6 2.5
BY 2.8 1.0 1.3 0.3 0.9 1.1 1.7 2.5
CK 5.4 8.3 3.0 1.9 3.0 7.6 6.8 2.8
UZ 1.9  4.2 5.8
DD 4.7 6.5 5.1 3.5 4.5 4.7 6.6 6.5
AJ 4.2 3.8 4.1 3.8 4.1 2.8 3.5 7.1
B7   8.3 11.0 12.2 9.2
U2 5.9 9.4 9.9 7.5 6.5 8.9 8.8 10.3
BA 2.6 3.8 4.4 4.9 4.7 7.2 7.7 11.2
AE 12.5 11.3 10.3 8.3 5.8 12.5 12.5 11.4
CH 10.0 6.7 10.5 8.6 1.5 10.3 11.7 11.8
UW   8.2 9.7 11.7 12.6
UT 18.9 23.6 17.4 17.7 11.1 18.2 24.0 21.4
AF 24.5 23.7 17.3 14.9 14.4 21.9 24.8 22.6
CJ 32.8 28.8 26.1 15.8 16.5 25.5 30.9 24.3
B6   18.8 22.6 22.9 24.4
UV 36.3 33.9 35.2 31.2 27.1 29.2 36.9 38.4
B8   22.7 38.1 38.2 39.2
UH 44.8 44.9 40.6 37.4 37.1 36.9 37.6 39.7
CB 42.9 48.1 26.0 14.9 25.7 34.3 34.2 40.1
B5   40.0 32.1 36.6 40.8
CL 40.0 24.0 27.4 24.8 23.9 32.5 34.3 41.3
CM 39.4 40.6 34.1 33.2 29.9 37.1 37.2 41.5
CE 51.0 49.4 44.9 43.2 35.4 40.0 43.1 45.6
CF 39.2 44.6 35.2 35.6 36.7 37.9 45.9 46.9
CD 49.5 46.0 48.0 40.5 42.1 47.6 52.2 54.0
DB 39.6 45.6 40.5 38.1 41.6 48.0 54.6 56.2
OO 38.6 39.0 49.6 53.7 55.4 55.5 57.1 59.7
CA 67.9 71.5 68.6 64.1 65.7 66.3 66.7 67.1
G6 52.7 55.6 57.9 59.3 59.2 58.7 68.2 70.7
CN 87.6 83.6 70.9 68.0 72.0 84.3 91.2 92.2
H1   33.3 100.0 100.0
H2   * 100.0 100.0
Blank cells: Enlistment program not offered for that FY. 
* No enlistees for this program.  
(Source: TFDW, MCRISS, FY00-FY07) 
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Additionally this research identified enlistment 
programs that exceeded their annual requirement. For 
example, the UH program consistently exceeded the annual 
requirement, as shown in Table 39. In FY01 the UH program 
exceeded the requirement by 466 enlistees. There are 
several other programs that exceeded the annual requirement 
by more than 100 enlistees.  
 
Table 39.   Number of Marine Corps Enlistment Programs 
short or over annual requirement 
Number of enlistment programs +/- annual requirement 
Program FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 AVG 
UH 118 466 35 -31 266 115 2 49 128
CE 0 48 23 104 46 125 15 3 46
BA -65 46 1 108 -25 228 -29 -6 32
AF 48 2 52 154 -52 8 11 2 28
CN 3 30 5 60 40 43 1 28 26
DD 26 24 8 81 70 -2 3 -3 26
CB 40 153 -52 84 -46 15 -7 1 24
AG 14 8 1 33 -10 96 0 5 18
BX 35 14 104 46 -1 -30 -10 -12 18
AJ -3 2 1 29 1 110 0 -11 16
UV 41 1 1 -1 46 -2 5 13 13
UT 12 38 25 53 -1 -30 -4 -12 10
CF -3 -17 1 31 50 14 3 1 10
CM -26 -116 2 108 81 4 12 -2 8
CD -10 -13 -14 64 -17 29 2 -2 5
CH 11 13 13 0 -4 -8 5 1 4
UW   -2 29 -4 1 -9 3
B5   13 4 -24 -2
CL 11 -19 -17 22 -10 -5 -3 -3 -3
DC 19 1 0 12 2 -31 -19 -28 -6
CG -9 10 -8 4 -15 -6 -13 -12 -6
CK -18 -39 -23 29 2 -14 -9 -2 -9
UJ -18 -5 -2 4 -17 -23 -6 -7 -9
B8   -29 0 -8 -12
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Number of enlistment programs +/- annual requirement 
Program FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 AVG 
AE 0 -13 0 -21 -18 -37 -6 -20 -14
UZ -69  1 1 -22
HD   -19 79 -110 -191 -60
G6 -89 -59 -15 -114 -94 -97 14 -51 -63
B6   -91 -21 -83 -65
CJ -46 -100 -37 -42 -81 -129 -32 -74 -68
X1   -70 -70
BY -94 -10 2 10 -33 -143 -101 -228 -75
B7   -48 -103 -85 -79
DB 11 -83 -163 91 -82 -341 -38 -128 -92
CA -100 -263 -321 9 -224 -495 -88 -103 -198
CC 3 -24 -527 -333 -362 -471 -104 -309 -266
(Source: MCRC, End of FY recruiting report) 
 
The total number of enlistees for all enlistment 
programs that were above or below the enlistment program 
requirement is shown in Table 40. For example, in FY01 856 
enlistees were enlisted into enlistment programs that had 
already met their annual requirement and the total number 
of unfilled billets, for enlistment programs that had not 
met their annual requirements, was 761. When programs 
exceed their annual requirement it can cause critical 
shortages in other enlistment programs, negatively 
impacting the shaping of the enlisted force. In FY06 and 
FY07 the Marine Corps reduced the number of enlistees 
assigned to programs that had met their annual requirement 





Table 40.   Cumulative number of enlistment programs 
over or short of annual requirement    
 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 
Over 392 856 274 1136 633 879 79 104 
Short -550 -761 -1179 -544 -1111 -2036 -703 -1483 
(Source: MCRC, End of FY recruiting report)  
 
Enlisting enough high-quality applicants to meet the 
enlistment program requirements is of grave concern. This 
research approached the problem by breaking down the 
percentage of applicants qualified for each enlistment 
program as shown in Table 37. It was found that seventy 
percent of the recruits enlisted into the Marine Corps are 
qualified for 19 of the 34 enlistment programs and nearly 
60 percent of the recruits are qualified for 28 of the 34 
enlistment programs. The AG enlistment program had the 
smallest number of qualified applicants, but in FY07 there 
were almost 14,000 qualified applicants to fill the 
requirement of 413 enlistees in the AG enlistment program. 
The data shows that the Marine Corps can recruit enough 
high-quality applicants to meet the requirements of the 
enlistment programs. The average AFQT and line scores for 







Table 41.   Average ASVAB Scores 
  
(Source: TFDW, MCRISS, FY00-FY07)  
3. EB Programs 
The Marine Corps has historically required an AFQT of 
50 or higher to qualify for an enlistment bonus. In the 
last few years, the Marine Corps has changed its policy for 
a few enlistment programs. This research examined what 
effect the change in policy has had on the quality of 
applicants enlisting in programs offering enlistments 
bonuses to “bravos.” 
In FY 2007, the Marine Corps changed the AFQT 
requirement for shipping bonuses to 31 and began offering 
the X1 enlistment bonus that required an AFQT of 31. There 
was also an enlistment bonus for Arabic interpreters that 
had an AFQT requirement as low as 21, but that was a small 
program that is no longer available. The X1 enlistment 
bonus was a feeder program for the B7, CA, CC, & DB 
enlistment programs. The first step was to look at the 
percentage of “bravos” that have historically enlisted in 
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the B7, CA, CC, & DB programs and compare it to the 
percentage of “bravos” in FY07. The percentage of “bravos” 
for each program is shown in Table 42. The percentage of 
“bravos” was found to be consistent with the percentages in 
the past and the overall percentage of “bravos” in FY07 was 
only 2 percent higher than the average for the time period 
analyzed as shown in Table 42. This data shows that 
offering a bonus to “bravos” did not significantly effect 
the quality of applicants.  
The X1 program was eliminated in FY08, but the Marine 
Corps began offering enlistment bonuses for the CA, CC, & 
DB programs that require an AFQT of 40. This should have a 
positive effect on the Marine Corps’ ability to fill 
critically short enlistment programs. Thirty-three percent 
of the Marine Corps enlistees are “bravos” as shown in 
Table 42. Some of the enlistment programs are filled with a 
higher percentage of “bravos.” Offering enlistment bonuses 
to “bravos” in critically short enlistment programs 
typically filled by “bravos” should level the playing field 
among more desirable enlistment programs typically filled 
by “bravos.” 
 
Table 42.    Percentage of Bravos 
Program 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 AVG 
Overall 34.3 35.1 32.9 31.3 29.8 31.7 32.4 34.9 32.8
BX 1.2 1 1.7 0.8 0.8 1.3 0.3 1.1 1.0
CG 0 0 2.8 1.3 0 1 2.2 1.2 1.1
BY 2.8 1 1.3 0.3 0.9 1.1 1.7 2.5 1.5
UJ 2.7 0.9 3.4 0.5 0.5 1.9 0.9 1.4 1.5
AG 2.8 3.9 1.7 1.7 0.5 2.1 1.6 2.5 2.1
UZ 1.9  4.2 5.8 4.0
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Program 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 AVG 
AJ 4.2 3.8 4.1 3.8 4.1 2.8 3.5 7.1 4.2
CK 5.4 8.3 3 1.9 3 7.6 6.8 2.8 4.9
DD 4.7 6.5 5.1 3.5 4.5 4.7 6.6 6.5 5.3
BA 2.6 3.8 4.4 4.9 4.7 7.2 7.7 11.2 5.8
CC 17.5 18.9 7.1 0.6 2.8 2.5 0.7 1.9 6.5
U2 5.9 9.4 9.9 7.5 6.5 8.9 8.8 10.3 8.4
CH 10 6.7 10.5 8.6 1.5 10.3 11.7 11.8 8.9
B7   8.3 11 12.2 9.2 10.2
UW   8.2 9.7 11.7 12.6 10.6
AE 12.5 11.3 10.3 8.3 5.8 12.5 12.5 11.4 10.6
UT 18.9 23.6 17.4 17.7 11.1 18.2 24 21.4 19.0
AF 24.5 23.7 17.3 14.9 14.4 21.9 24.8 22.6 20.5
B6   18.8 22.6 22.9 24.4 22.2
CJ 32.8 28.8 26.1 15.8 16.5 25.5 30.9 24.3 25.1
CL 40 24 27.4 24.8 23.9 32.5 34.3 41.3 31.0
CB 42.9 48.1 26 14.9 25.7 34.3 34.2 40.1 33.3
UV 36.3 33.9 35.2 31.2 27.1 29.2 36.9 38.4 33.5
B8   22.7 38.1 38.2 39.2 34.6
CM 39.4 40.6 34.1 33.2 29.9 37.1 37.2 41.5 36.6
B5   40 32.1 36.6 40.8 37.4
UH 44.8 44.9 40.6 37.4 37.1 36.9 37.6 39.7 39.9
CF 39.2 44.6 35.2 35.6 36.7 37.9 45.9 46.9 40.3
CE 51 49.4 44.9 43.2 35.4 40 43.1 45.6 44.1
DB 39.6 45.6 40.5 38.1 41.6 48 54.6 56.2 45.5
CD 49.5 46 48 40.5 42.1 47.6 52.2 54 47.5
OO 38.6 39 49.6 53.7 55.4 55.5 57.1 59.7 51.1
G6 52.7 55.6 57.9 59.3 59.2 58.7 68.2 70.7 60.3
CA 67.9 71.5 68.6 64.1 65.7 66.3 66.7 67.1 67.2
H1   33.3 100 100 77.8
CN 87.6 83.6 70.9 68 72 84.3 91.2 92.2 81.2
H2   * 100 100 100.0
Blank cells: program not offered for that FY. 
* No enlistees for this program. 
(Source: TFDW, MCRISS, FY00-FY07) 
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The last thing this research looked at was the 
attractiveness of the enlistment bonuses. This research 
focused on bonuses that had consistently assigned less than 
90 percent of the allocation. The percentage of the 
allocated bonuses used is shown in Table 42. 
 
Table 43.   Percentage of allocated bonuses used 
Number of Bonuses allocated 
Bonus 
prg/value Percentage of Bonuses used 
Enlistment 
prg FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07
BZ/5000 431 500 529 578 412 644 533 350
BY 91% 73% 78% 104% 94% 79% 92% 98%
E1/4000 85 120 118 124 108 134 155 109
AJ 91% 105% 69% 108% 91% 102% 99% 92%
E3/4000 15 15 12 35 18 31 36 201
CG 33% 33% 92% 97% 94% 87% 97% 98%
E4/6000 187 210 196 178 143 192 201 201
CK 79% 53% 80% 110% 90% 95% 97% 98%
E6/4000 24 50 50 101 71 106 104 125
DC 100% 60% 114% 97% 97% 85% 89% 90%
E7/3000 539 650 594 490 475 543 554 204
BA 86% 67% 99% 109% 97% 99% 98% 95%
*NA/5000  60 171 103
HD  148% 101% 92%
 60 54 72*NB/student 
ln payoff 
($10K)  27% 52% 21%
 60 35 78*NC/12 month 
educ allow  25% 23% 12%
 60 48 85*ND/36 mnth 
educ allow  30% 44% 20%
UZ/10000  402 416
UZ  100% 100%
X1/10000   1028
B7,CA,CC,DB   90%
**F1/5000   182
CA   100%
**F2/5000   197
CC   100%
F3/5000   260
CJ   94%
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Number of Bonuses allocated 
Bonus 
prg/value Percentage of Bonuses used 
Enlistment 
prg FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07
F4/6000   154
DD   106%
M1/10000   35
M1   97%
 
Blank cells: Enlistment bonus was not available for that FY. 
* NA, NB, NC, ND are all bonus programs for enlistment program HD.  
** Initial allocations for F1 was 480 and F2 was 409. Allocations 
not already assigned to an enlistee were deleted when the X1 
program was incorporated in the summer of FY 2007.   
    (Source: MCRC, End of FY recruiting report) 
     
There were several enlistment incentives whose fill 
rate dropped below 90 percent during one of the fiscal 
years the incentive was offered, but there were three 
enlistment incentives that remained well below 90 percent 
the entire time they were offered: NB, NC and ND (see Table 
42). The NA, NB, NC, and ND were incentives for the HD 
program. Applicants enlisting in the HD program were given 
the option to select either a $5000 EB (NA), $10000 student 
loan payoff, 12 month education allowance, or a 36 month 
education allowance at half the monthly rate. A majority of 
the applicants chose the NA incentive, as shown in Table 
42. The student loan payoff and education allowance 
incentives were not as attractive. The HD program was also 
one of the programs that this research identified as 
consistently not meeting annual enlistment program 
requirements (Table 36). This study can not determine 
whether just offering the $5000 EB or eliminating the cap 
on the number of $5000 EBs allocated would have encouraged 
more enlistees to select the HD enlistment program, but it 
may be something the Marine Corps may want to try if the HD 
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program is incorporated again.33 In addition there were two 
incentives offered in FY07 that the Marine Corps identified 
as not enticing enough enlistees: F1 and F2 (HQMC, M&RA, 
Enlisted Plans Section). The initial allocation for the F1 
was 480 bonuses and the F2 was 409 bonuses. Actually, the 
Marine Corps used less than 50 percent of the original 
allocation. The F1 and F2 both offered a $5000 EB and they 
required a minimum AFQT of 50 to qualify for the bonus. The 
F1 was a bonus program for the CA enlistment program and 
the F2 was a bonus program for the CC enlistment program. 
In the summer of 2007, any F1 and F2 allocations that had 
not already been assigned were deleted and the Marine Corps 
incorporated the X1.34 The X1 EB offered a $10000 EB, 
required a minimum AFQT of 31 to qualify, and was a bonus 
program for enlistment programs B7, CA, CC, and DB. In the 
three-month time period during which the X1 was offered, 90 
percent of the 1000 bonuses allocated were used.35 The 
question this research can not answer is, did reducing the 
AFQT requirement or increasing the monetary incentive have 
the larger effect on assigning the bonus? If the AFQT 
requirement had been reduced on the F1 program, it might 
have attracted more enlistees, since a majority of those 
who enlist into the CA program are “bravos,” as shown in 
Table 42. As stated previously the Marine Corps began to 
offer more enlistment bonuses to “bravos” in FY08. 
                     
33 The HD program was not offered in FY08 (HQMC, M&RA, Enlisted Plans 
Section) 
34 Chapter II, page 26 of this thesis provides additional information 
on the X1 program. 
35 Phone conversation USMC representative assigned to M&RA, Enlisted 
Plans Section. 
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V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY  
This research analyzed the Marine Corps enlistment 
bonus program (EBP). The purpose was to provide MPP-20 with 
alternatives to increase the effectiveness of the EBP. The 
research was primarily qualitative, but it included a 
quantative analysis of the recruiting data from the Total 
Force Data Warehouse and the Marine Corps Recruiting 
Command. 
The Marine Corps uses the EBP to attract high-quality 
applicants into enlistment programs for critically short 
military occupational skills. The research found that the 
Marine Corps has been very successful at meeting its yearly 
recruiting goal. The problem lies in recruiting the correct 
number of applicants into each enlistment program and 
shipping the applicants to recruit training at a specified 
time. The research analyzed previous studies to find 
methods that could be used to predict the optimal 
enlistment incentive in order to level the playing field 
between assumed “desirable” enlistment programs and 
“undesirable” enlistment programs. 
The methodologies of previous studies have varied, but 
generally they used regression analysis on historical data 
or analysis of survey responses. The advantage of 
historical data is that it tends to be readily available 
and it captures real choices with binding decisions. One 
drawback to historical data is that there has to be 
sufficient variation in the data to effectively estimate 
the effects of the monetary incentives. Surveys used to 
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analyze monetary incentives vary in complexity, but they 
typically gather data from either the civilian youth 
population or military recruits. An advantage to collecting 
information from military recruits is that they are more 
accessible, and are familiar with military programs. 
Recruits can also provide insight into why they chose to 
enlist, what they would have done in the absence of an 
incentive, and what decisions they would have made if other 
incentives had been offered. The drawback to surveys is 
that applicable surveys are not always available, and 
developing surveys and collecting the data can be time-
intensive and costly. 
The research analyzed recruiting data from the Total 
Force Data Warehouse (TFDW) and the Marine Corps Recruiting 
Command. The TFDW was missing a large amount of recruiting 
data before FY 2000, so this research used recruiting data 
from FY 2000 through FY 2007 only. Marine Corps Recruiting 
Command (MCRC) was also limited on how far back it could 
provide data, but it was able to provide data from FY 2000 
through FY 2007 as well. The data obtained could not be 
used to effectively estimate the optimal value of an 
enlistment bonus, but the recruiting data was useful in 
identifying relationships inherent to the data.           
B. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
a. How can MPP-20 Effectively Predict the 
Optimal Dollar Amount for Enlistment 
Bonuses? 
Conclusion: MPP-20 could effectively predict the 
optimal dollar amount of enlistment incentives by 
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collecting survey data from enlistees or recruits. The 
survey should have the participants repeatedly select from 
a short list of enlistment programs and incentives to 
determine the participant’s preference. The focus of the 
survey should be on determining what incentives will level 
the playing field between assumed “desirable” and 
“undesirable” enlistment programs. Tabulation of the 
choices made by survey participants and multiple regression 
analysis can be used to determine the marginal effects of 
different enlistment incentives. 
Recommendation: This research recommends that 
during the first week of recruit training, the Marine Corps 
should administer a choice-based survey focused on 
enlistment programs and incentives to recruits. The 
information gathered could be used to determine the 
incentive preferences of recruits that chose to join the 
Marine Corps. This would also give feedback on hypothetical 
incentives being considered by the Marine Corps. 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
a. Can Data from the TFDW be used to 
Effectively Predict the Optimal Dollar 
Amount for Enlistment Bonuses? 
Conclusion: This research determined that data 
from the TFDW cannot be used to effectively predict the 
optimal dollar amount for enlistment bonuses. The reasons 
the TFDW data could not be used as shown in chapter IV are 
these. First, the research was limited on how far back data 
could be collected on the Marine Corps EBP. Second, until 
recently, only a limited number of enlistment programs 
qualified for an enlistment bonus, and the budget for the 
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EBP had been relatively small. Third, there is minimal 
variation in the values of the bonuses during the time 
period used in this research. 
Recommendation: Continue to collect and maintain 
recruiting data in the TFDW. Recent increases in the 
enlistment bonus program may create adequate variation to 
permit effective analysis of TFDW data in the future.  
b. Do Minimum AFQT Requirements for Enlistment 
Bonus Programs Decrease the Effectiveness of 
the Enlistment Bonus Program? 
Conclusion: The research was not able to 
determine with confidence if minimum AFQT requirements 
decrease the effectiveness of the EBP. This research did 
identify circumstances where authorizing enlistment bonuses 
to “bravos” may have increased the effectiveness of the EBP 
as shown in chapter IV. For example, the X1 enlistment 
bonus that required a minimum AFQT of 31 was more effective 
at attracting enlistees to select the CA program than the 
F1 enlistment bonus with a minimum AFQT requirement of 50. 
The X1 also offered a larger incentive, so this research 
cannot determine whether increasing the incentive or 
reducing the minimum AFQT requirement had the larger 
effect. There are other factors described in chapter 4 that 
support authorizing enlistment bonuses to “bravos.”  
Recommendation: MPP-20 should continue 
experimenting with EBP requirements. 
c. What Factors Could be Decreasing the 
Effectiveness of the EBP. 
Conclusion: The Marine Corps EBP was unchanged 
for several years (FY00-FY05). The reasoning behind not 
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changing the EBP was that the budget was relatively small 
and the Marine Corps was consistently meeting its annual 
recruiting goal, so representatives did not see a need to 
modify the EBP.36 Failing to allocate additional funds or 
change the enlistment programs that qualified for an 
enlistment bonus could be the reason that, as shown in 
chapter 4, some enlistment programs were consistently short 
of their annual requirement. 
Additionally, there were several enlistment 
programs that had exceeded their annual requirement. For 
example, the UH program exceeded its annual requirement in 
FY01 by 466 enlistees. This reduces the pool of applicants 
who can be assigned to critically short enlistment 
programs. In the past few years, MPP-20 has reduced the 
number of enlistees authorized for assignment to enlistment 
programs that have met their annual requirement. The fill 
rate of enlistment programs needs continuous monitoring to 
prevent exceeding annual requirements and reducing the 
number of critically short enlistment programs.  
The research identified that over 50 percent of 
the enlistees with open contracts are “bravos” and, as 
shown in Chapter IV, that some enlistment programs have a 
very low percentage of “bravos.” Naturally, these are 
enlistment programs that have a smaller pool of qualified 
applicants. For example, approximately 2 percent of the CC 
and BY programs are “bravos.” Relying on open contracts to  
 
 
                     
36 (Source: phone conversation with representative assigned to M&RA, 
Enlisted Plans Section and MCRC).  
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fill all of the critically short enlistment programs could 
leave some enlistment programs short of qualified 
enlistees. 
Recommendation: Change the mandatory annual 
meeting with MPP-20 and MCRC to a quarterly meeting. This 
will increase the communication between the two 
organizations and ensure that the enlistment programs and 
the EBP are continuously monitored to ensure the 
effectiveness of the program. This will be useful, because 
as the market changes, or if the fill rate for an 
enlistment program is not progressing as planned, timely 
actions can be taken to correct the deficiency. 
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH AND STUDY 
There are three recommendations for further research 
to increase the effectiveness of the EBP. 
1. Recommend developing a choice-based survey to 
determine the incentive preferences for Marine Corps 
enlistees. Determine whether the information gathered from 
the survey could be used to predict the optimal incentive 
for enlistment bonuses. 
2. Examine what effect, if any, enlistment bonuses may 
have on the successful completion of military occupational 
skills (MOS) training. Is there a higher rate of completion 
of initial MOS training among enlistees assigned an 
enlistment bonus than among enlistees not assigned an 
enlistment bonus? 
3. Examine the effectiveness of using open contracts 
to fill critically short enlistment programs. A small 
percentage of enlistees are not assigned an enlistment 
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program prior to recruit training. Enlistees not assigned 
an enlistment program (open contract) are used to fill 
critically short enlistment programs. Are there enough 
qualified open contracts to fill all of the critically 
short enlistment programs? 
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